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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine the Law Commission's proposals in 
respect of their final report on CHILDREN: Non-Accidental Death and 
Serious Injury, Law Com 282 and to determine whether the proposals are 
capable of meeting the criteria set by the Law Commission; i.e. that any 
recommendations must be justifiable on their own terms. 
In order to do this a strict literal legal methodology will be employed. This is 
not because of its suitability to meet the social malaise that is the cause of the 
problem, or because of the fact that it identifies how that problem might be 
resolved, it is utilised because it is regarded as the primary method of 
interpretation. 
The dissertation is split into two distinct chapters and both of these chapters 
are equally sub-divided into two parts. In chapter one part I, the proposed Bill 
is analysed clause by clause and subjected to imminent critique. Part II of 
chapter one then utilises the cases identified by the Law Commission to 
determine whether the provisions of the new Bill would substantially alter the 
out-come of any of the cases demonstrative of the identified lacuna. Reference 
is also draw to the partial enactment of the Bill within the Domestic Violence 
Crime and Victims Act 2004; however this Act is not the main focus within 
the dissertation. 
The Second and last chapter re-evaluates the pre-existing case law in this 
area. Again the methodology employed is one of literal legal interpretation, 
the reason for this being the fact that during the research for this paper it 
became apparent that there was.a commonly held misinterpretation as to the 
extent and focus of the legal principles found within the substantive cases in 
this area of law. For instance, the case of Lowe 1973 is the substantive case on 
the distinction between an unlawful act and an omission within the offence of 
unlawful act manslaughter, omissions not being considered sufficient for this 
offence. Lowe is still considered good law despite being overruled by the 
House of Lords in Sheppard 1981. Reconciliation of these two cases and the 
earlier case of Senior 1899 is employed to demonstrate this misinterpretation. 
x 
Introduction 
Children are being killed or seriously injured at an alarming rate, three a week in 
fact.' But, this is only part of the tragedy, because it is not happening in some war-
torn third world country ruled by a tyrannical despotic regime. This unwholesome 
atrocity is occurring in England. The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children's (NSPCC) Working Group reported that of these children more than half 
were less than six months old. 2 What is even worse is that those responsible are non-
other than the child's parents or primary carers and it is happening in the child's 
home; a place that should be safe. Unfortunately this tragedy is further compounded 
by the fact that the law appears to be unable to obtain a successful prosecution in the 
majority of cases; 75% of cases are reported as not even being prosecuted 3 . The 
media and lobbyists are quick to point out that 'someone is literally getting away 
with murder'.4 
These statistics and the fact that the law appears to have become intractable, by virtue 
of the procedural and evidential constraints placed upon the courts, particularly by 
the decision in Lane and Lane, 5 has led to the Law Commission being asked to make 
recommendations to the Government to close this unacceptable lacuna. 
So, what exactly is the problem? This impasse, or lacuna, can best be expressed by 
re-iterating the Law Commission's enunciation of the problem: 
'Judge Isobel Plumstead, Papers for the NSPCC "Which of you did it?" Conference in Cambridge. 2 
November 2002, Introduction and Background, pam 8; as reported in Law Commission Consultative 
Report, CHILDREN: NON-ACCIDENTAL DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY (CRIMINAL TRIALS), 
Law Corn 279, pan 2.2 and the Law Commission's Final Report, CHILDREN: NON-ACCIDENTAL 
DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY (CRIMINAL TRIALS), Law Com 282, pan 2.29 
2 
 Judge Isobel Plumstead, Papers for the NSPCC "Which of you did it?" Conference in Cambridge, 2 
November 2002, Introduction and Background, pam 8 
Law Com 279, pan I, Executive Summary p.iv; of the remainder only a small percentage result in a 
conviction for Homicide (murder or manslaughter) or Grievous Bodily Harm; Law Com 282 pam 2.29 
Law Commission's Reports, Law Com 279, pam 2.2 and Law Com 282 pan 2.29; Esam, B., why should 
killer parents be allowed to escape justice, The Times, Oct 29, 2002; Dyer, C., Parents 'get away with 
murder', The Guardian (London) November 1,2002 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5 
A child is cared for by two people (both parents, or a parent and 
another person). The child dies and medical evidence suggests that the 
death occurred as a result of ill-treatment. It is not clear which of the 
two carers is directly responsible for the ill-treatment which caused 
death. It is clear that at least one of the carers is guilty of a very serious 
criminal offence but it is possible that the ill-treatment occurred while 
one carer was asleep, or out of the room. 6 
Obviously this situation is intolerable but the law is very clear on the point, as 
expressed by Croom-Johnson U when giving his judgement in Lane and Lane, 7 
although the reasoning has its roots in the judgement of Lord Goddard CJ in Abbott 8 
who stated that: 
If two people are jointly indicted for the commission of a crime and 
the evidence does not point to one rather than the other, and there is no 
evidence that they were acting in concert, the jury ought to return a 
verdict of Not Guilty in the case of both because the prosecution have 
not proved the case. [Because], in those circumstances, [it] it is left to 
the defendants to get out of the difficulty if they can, that would put 
the onus on the defendants to prove themselves not guilty. My brother 
Finnemore J. remembers a case in which two sisters were indicted for 
murder, and there was evidence that they had both been in the room at 
the time of the murder; but the prosecution could not show that sister 
A or that sister B had committed the offence. Very likely one or the 
other must have committed it, but there was no evidence which one. 9 
The problem of course is not a new one, the case of Abbott' ° was decided fifty years 
ago, but the sheer scale of the problem and the attention that accompanied it brought 
about the need for a change in the law. However it has always been the author's 
contention that despite eminent judicial and academic reasoning to the contrary, the 
6 
 Law Corn 279&282 para 1.1 
v Lane and Lane(1986) 82 CrApp R5 at p.11 
RvAbbott(1955)39CrAppR 141 
Ibid. at p.148 and p.503 respectively 
' 0 RvAbbott(1955)39CrAppR 141 
12 
law has been and still is capable of bringing a just result'' which is apparently denied 
by the existence of this lacuna. 
This research intends to demonstrate that the rationale for the judgement in Lane and 
Lane,' 2 and the reasoning, taken from the judgement of Lord Goddard CJ in Abbott' 3 
have been misapplied in subsequent cases culminating in legal consequences for the 
justice system that should never have been allowed to develop. 
In presenting this argument the themes to be examined will be divided in two core 
chapters. In chapter one the focus will be on the recommendations made by the Law 
Commission and their partial enactment within sections 5 and 6 of the Domestic 
Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004. It is intended to analyse the 
recommendations, in order to determine whether they achieve the desired result, 
namely a closing of the identified lacuna. The form this analysis will take is one of 
comparison. By first asking the question: Does the proposed provision meet any of 
the elements that are identifiable as forming part of the lacuna? And secondly, by 
using the factual scenarios taken from those cases identified by the Law Commission 
as demonstrable of the lacuna and utilising them to determine whether the proposed 
provisions would result in a substantially different result than that which was actually 
obtained? The aim being to examine the effectiveness of the proposed legislation to 
close the lacuna and thereby bring a just result. This second limb is also pursued 
because as the Law Commission rightly assert: 
A new offence must be justifiable on its own terms." 
Chapter two will be concerned with a reappraisal of the law that exists, and which 
pre-existed the recommendations; notwithstanding their partial enactment within the 
Act of 2004. It is intended to show that those offences categorised as involuntary 
manslaughter, gross negligence and unlawful act manslaughter, are capable of 
A 'just result', the existence of this problem and the fact that no one is being brought to account means 
that Justice and society is suffering a wrong, the law exists to ensure accountability of action and 
responsibility, the idea of a 'just result' is the bringing of these people to account. 
12 
 R v Lane and Lane(l986) 82Cr App R5 
13 RvAbbott(1955)39CrAppR 141 
" LC282para 1.18 
13 
addressing this problem to a much greater extent than is currently the case. In order 
to justify the argument it will be necessary to discuss not only these two offences of 
manslaughter' 5 
 but also the scope of the 'duty of care' within the offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter, and the concept and scope of joint enterprise for the 
offence of unlawful act manslaughter, where more than one person is being 
prosecuted. 
There is debate as to whether subjective reckless manslaughter exists as a substantive offence or whether 
it is subsumed by unlawful act manslaughter; or gross negligence manslaughter, notwithstanding this 
debate any overlap will be highlighted where necessary. A full discussion on the point is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
14 
Chapter 1: A Critical Analysis of the Law Commission's Proposals 
As stated in the introduction, it is intended in this chapter of the dissertation to 
discuss the recommendations proposed by the Law Commission, in order to 
determine whether they achieve the desired result. Following this a case study will be 
undertaken using the same cases as those identified by the Law Commission to 
demonstrate the alleged intractability of the lacuna. The result of this analytical study 
is to determine if the proposals are 'justifiable on their own terms'. 1 
Clause 1: Cruelty contributing to death 
The Law Commission assert that the first clause is the main mechanism for 
determining the culpability of the defendant, and they state in paragraph 6.6 of the 
final report, their belief that the clause achieves their aims. As such, the defendant's 
culpability under clause 1 can be determined when the defendant has been found 
guilty under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933;2  i.e. wilfully 
neglects etc... a child which is likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury. But 
where the likely and unnecessary suffering or injury either results in or significantly 
contributes to the death of the child. The Law Commission in their commentary also 
state that it matters not whether the suffering or injury was caused directly by the 
defendant or by a third party. The main crux of the culpability lies in the fact that the 
defendant has breached his duty of care, under section 1 of the 1933 Act, and that this 
breach is connected to the child's death. 
Problems exist however in respect of both the Law Commission's reasoning and the 
offence proposed. The lacuna identified the problem as being one where, 'there is no 
evidence capable of establishing that the defendant committed the act directly, or was 
a party to a joint enterprise'. The proposed clause does not address either of these 
identified problems. Neither does it advance the prosecutions' case in respect of the 
breach of 'duty of care', because presence alone does not establish guilt; per the ratio 
Law Corn para 1.18 
2 
 Section I of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 is set out in full in appendix 2, as are all other 
statues cited with the main body of the text when that provision does not accompany the reference. 
16 
in Richardson 3, Abbott4 and Forman and Ford. 5 The latter of these three cases 
concerned an alleged assault by one police officer against a suspect whilst in the 
presence of a fellow officer. It was held that passive assistance or encouragement by 
failure to excise a duty of control did not amount to aiding and abetting, etc., within 
section 8 of the Accessory and Abettors Act 1861. Further to this, the.House of 
Lords held in the case of Shepparct that the word 'wilfully' in section 1 of the 1933 
Act was not to be interpreted as restricted to the physical acts or the omission of 
neglect, but extended to the consequences. Therefore the accused had to be found to 
have realised that his action or failure would lead to a likelihood of suffering or 
injury to health. The consequence of this is that the prosecution, for a charge under 
clause 1, or section 1A of the 1933 Act as it would be, must prove to the requisite 
standard of proof7 that the accused was aware that the child under his care was, at the 
very least, likely to suffer injury or harm and that as a consequence of that injury or 
harm, the child was likely to die. The clause does not state how the prosecution can 
establish the nexus between the wilful neglect in the first part and the significant, and 
foreseeable, contribution in the second. 
Even if the usual course of presentation is dispensed with and the prosecution attempt 
to prove part one first and then build the second part, there must still be some 
evidence for the jury to at least infer the requisite foresight. But this takes us, or more 
accurately the prosecution, back to the fact that the lacuna states that there is no 
evidence to establish this. Equally, if there is evidence to state that the defendant 
wilfully neglected the child, even by omission, to such an extent that the jury can 
determine that the defendant either foresaw, or was reckless to, the infliction of harm 
or injury likely to cause death, why prosecute under this offence and not under 
manslaughter, or even murder. 8 
3 Richardson (1785)1 Leach 387 
4 R v Abbott (1955) 39 Cr App R 141 
5 R v Forman and Ford [1988] Crim LR 677 
6 
 R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, HL 
'Beyond reasonable doubt', per Woo/minwon v DPI' [1935] AC 462 
This question is also raised by Professor Ormerod as editor of Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, I 1 °td., 
Ormerod, 11, 2006, Oxford Press, Oxford, p.502; however, Jefferson, Criminal Law, 71h 
 Ed., 2006, 
Pearson, Harlow, p157, identifies both the difference between the offence within the Domestic Violence 
Crime and Victims Act 2004, and the offence proposed by the Law Commission, but there is an 
element to his findings that questions whether negligence is an appropriate level of mental culpability in 
a criminal law. 
17 
The Law Commission states however that this connection is clear, and that: 
• .it is not necessary for a conviction under the proposed new section 
that the person who is guilty of the basic section I. offence causes the 
child's death in a sense sufficient to justi& a conviction for 
manslaughter."9 
Any prosecution under the proposed section must surely be open to challenge. 
Because if the jury determine that a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter fails, 
they must obviously be saying that the prosecution have not proffered sufficient 
evidence to prove to them, that the defendant did the act directly or was a party to a 
joint enterprise; i.e. that he aided or abetted the crime by a failure to exercise control 
as per the cases of Forman and Ford° and Dytham." If the charge was one of gross 
negligence manslaughter and the charge fails then the jury is equally saying that there 
is insufficient evidence to show that the defendant failed to do that which he 'ought' 
to have done. The word ought, is emphasised because, according to the House of 
Lords' decision inAdomako:' 2 
[in] regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the 
defendant was so bad as in all the circumstances as to amount in the 
jury's judgement to a criminal act, or omission." t3 
This means that while this test is described as objective in nature the jury must have 
considered that the defendant had at least some knowledge of the circumstance that 
contributed to the death, because the defendant's conduct must be so significant as to 
warrant criminal liability. In every case, the jury is going to assess the knowledge of 
the defendant and weigh that knowledge against the circumstances. Notwithstanding 
the objective test, the jury must be forbidden to find a case of gross negligence 
manslaughter against those defendants who are stupid, ignorant or personally 
inadequate, just as they must be forbidden to find them guilty under section 1 of the 
Law Corn 282 pam 6.6 emphasis is per the original 
v Forman and Ford [1988] Crim LR 677 
R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 
2 RvAdomako [1995] AC 171 
Ibid. at p.171, see also p.I87; see further, Srnith and Hogan, Criminal Law, I l'Ed., Ormerod, D., 2006, 
Oxford Press, Oxford, p.133 
'U 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933: See Sheppard.' 4 The Adornako' 5 test will 
be examined in greater detail in chapter 2. The assessment of liability under either 
clause! (section IA) or manslaughter, in either guise, thus becomes circular 
In relation to the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 section 5, the 
requirements would appear to fall on the same grounds, although they are in some 
respects explicitly drawn in narrower terms. Whilst this section encompasses a wider 
range of victims and can take a multifarious route to find liability, it is narrower 
because it is explicit to the requirement 'that the circumstance surrounding death 
must be of the same kind as that foreseen by the defendant." 6 Professor Ormerod 
notes that the victim's death must occur in the same circumstances, as he ought to 
have foreseen.' 7 However a similar restriction can be implicitly interpreted into 
clause I. This has the effect of being more restrictive than gross negligence 
manslaughter in circumstances similar to that found in the case of Stone and 
Dobinson; 18 this case too will be examined more filly in chapter 2. 
Clauses 2 & 3: Failure to protect a child and the effect of intoxication 
In short, this clause states that the defendant will be culpable if at the material time 
the defendant was aged 16 or over, had responsibility for the child and was connected 
to the child by a number of specific ties' 9 and is aware, or ought to be aware, that 
there is a real risk that a specific and serious offence might be committed against the 
child and fails to take reasonable steps to prevent that specific offence being 
committed. 
The Law Commission state that they envisage that a person with responsibility is to 
be criminally liable for failure to protect a child from a 'real risk' of serious harm (as 
v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, IlL at p.418E 
15 RvAdomako [1995] AC 171 
16 
 See section 5 (l)(d)(iii); Appendix Six p.96 post 
17 
 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, I lthEd.,  Ormerod, Li, 2006, Oxford Press, Oxford, p.502 
' R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354 
The specific ties are, blood relationship, co-habitation in the same household (undefined), or looks after 
the child by arrangement, whether paid or not, but takes care of the child wholly or mainly in the child's 
home. 
in the case of Re ff 20) and that the responsibility does not cease, nor the liability 
tenninate, merely because the care arrangement ends. 2 ' The Law Commission state: 
[W]e see great importance in making it clear that a person who has 
responsibility and has a connection with the child should not be able, 
with impunity, to expose the child to an anticipated abusive situation 
simply because the arrangement or the visit has come to an end. We 
believe that it is proper that such a person should be under an 
obligation to take reasonable steps to avoid thrther abuse. Depending 
on the circumstances 
This statement is both logical and reasonable, especially given the nature and 
seriousness of the problem, and especially in relation to one parent handing control of 
a child back to the other, because it is accepted that parental responsibility does not 
end in this circumstance, 23 just as it does no end by the parent leaving the room: 
Marsh and Marsh24 and Russell and Russell. 25 It logically follows that it is 
reasonable to place a similar liability upon any other person having a responsibility 
for that child, whether acquired by this section or any other statutory provision or by 
virtue of the common law. It does however raise a number of further questions. What 
is the extent of liability for those parents, or carers, who take a child to a contact 
session with a known abusive or violent parent? Because, while it is acknowledged 
that a reasonable person might not consider this to be a 'risk situation that ought not 
to be ignored' 26 the Law Commission state quite specifically that: 
It is what the him or herself "ought to be aware of' which will 
determine whether they are potentially culpable. 27 
20 
 Re H and Others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, see Law Corn 282 para 
6.22 
2! Law Corn 282 pam 6.19 
22 
 Ibid 
23 
 Children Act 1989 s2 
24 
 Marsh and Marsh v Hodgson [1974] Crirn LR 35 
25 
 R v Russell and Russell (1989)85 Cr App R 388 
26 
 Re H and Others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 per Lord Nicholls at p585, 
see Law Cont 282 para 6.22 
27 
 Law Corn 282 pam 6.23, emphasise in the original. 
20 
While the liability in such a situation as this might seem slight and only potential, 
there still exists the possibility of culpability, especially if the primary parent has not 
raised, of has ceased to raise, the issue with the authorities. 28 The problem of abuse 
within this scenario is by no means rare, the NSPCC report that: 
At least fifteen children in England and Wales have been killed by 
separated parents or step-parents, since 1998 as a result of contact 
arrangements. 29 
Such culpability would appear harsh if not cruel given the circumstance. There also 
remains the question of liability in respect of the young baby-sitter, who whilst 
sitting becomes aware that the child being cared for is being abused by at least one 
parent. To refrain from returning the child to its parents potentially brings liability for 
the offence of kidnapping. 3° The answer would appear to lie in the natural and 
automatic response that the prosecution would naturally indict the parents, but this 
then raises the issue of degrees of liability and superior or inferior responsibility,. 
which is contrary to the theory that we are all equal in law. There is also the further 
question as to whether a person with responsibility has a duty to protect others from 
an abusive or violent child in their care. This question is posed not only because it is 
linked to the last, but because Professor Glanville Williams uses such an example 
when taking about duty of care and joint liability in his paper "Which of you did 
it". 3 ' This is one of the papers referred to by the Law Commission in their reports, 
which highlights the complex problem contained within the lacuna. It is 
acknowledged that this question would at first blush appear to be outside the remit of 
the lacuna. However, the author would submit that it forms a distinct part of the 
identified lacuna, because of the duty to control. This matter will also be examined in 
chapter 2 when dealing with omission and joint enterprise. 
25 
 Consider the fate of Vandanaden Patel who entered a 'risk situation' at Stoke Newington Police Station, 
and was stabbed twelve times; see The Independent 3 March 1992; Aileen McColgan, In Defence of 
Battered women who Kill, (1999) OiLS 508 at 520 
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 Report by the NSPCC, Legislative Loophole is Risking Lives of Children, June 14, 2004, 
http :I/www .nspcc .org.uk/html/home/informationresourceslpal egi slati veloopholeendangeri ngch i Idren .htm 
° The charge might equally be one of false imprisonment, or child abduction under s2 of the Child 
Abduction Act 1984, depending on the facts and circumstance. Interestingly however, is that fact that 
should she be found to have a lawful excuse, then the parents themselves might be found guilty of 
kidnapping; D [1984] AC 778 
Glanville Williams, Which of you did it?, (1989)52 MLR 179 
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As a fundamental 'stand alone' offence, there appears to be nothing that distinguishes 
clause 2 from the existing offence under section 1 of the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933. As stated earlier the word 'wilfully' requires a level of subjective 
knowledge equal to that in clause 2 and referring back to the quotation made 
earlier, 32 the Law Commission are equally not concerned with those persons who are 
described as 'stupid, ignorant or personally inadequate'; notwithstanding that there is 
a reference to what might be equally described as the stereotypical defendant in these 
type of offences: 
the defendant will be an, often inadequate, individual with few 
material or mental resources. [sic] 33 
Therefore, when 'wilfully' is connected to the consequence of the offence by the verb 
'exposes', then the person with responsibility for the child becomes liable. Clause 2 
might equally be considered to be of more limited scope than section 1 by virtue of 
the person having responsible being restricted to those who only have care of the 
child wholly or mainly at the child's home, 34 in which case there is an even stronger 
argument that the offence does not meet the Law Commission's own standard that 
the offences be 'justifiable on their own terms', 35 because a person with 
responsibility should be liable if they act with the requisite knowledge irrespective of 
where they 'care' for the child. 
The specific incorporation of voluntary intoxication (clause 3) of any substance, 
which the defendant realised would impair his, or her, judgement is merely the 
importation of common law into statute. The case of Ma/ewski 36 thdicates that where 
intoxicants are taken voluntarily then any crime described as being one of basic 
intent, which includes crimes where the mental element is subjective recklessness, is 
proved in respect to that mental element; i.e. in respect to the subjective recklessness. 
32 Law Corn 282 para 6-23; first pam p.8 ante 
B Ibid. para 6.30 - Note: The use of 'often inadequate' was probably meant to be in single inverted 
commas, however the quote was typeset as appears above. 
Ibid pam 6.11; Oflences Against Children Bill 2004 Clause 2(6)(b); see Appendix I at page 82 post 
35 Ibid. para 1.18 
DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443; See also Lipman [1969] 3 All ER 410 
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The rationale is best expressed by reiteration the finds of Lord Mustill in KinEston:" 
[The problem of establishing mens rea] is cured by the intentional 
taking of drink without regard to its possible effects as [being] a 
substitute for the mental element ordinarily required by the offence. 
The intent is transferred from the taking of drink to the commission of 
the prohibited act. The ... defendant cannot be heard to rely on the 
absence of the mental element when it is absent because of his own 
voluntary acts. Borrowing an expression from a far distant field it may 
be said that the defendant is stopped from relying on his self-induced 
incapacity. 38 
The exception to this common law presumption is the same as that found in sub-
clause (2)(b), medically prescribed drugs, and any lack of knowledge that being the 
negative of(2)(a). The effects of the common law on a section 1 offence are therefore 
the same as the effects of this clause on either clause I or 2 as such nothing is added 
to the law by its inclusion. 
Clause 4: The statutory responsibility 
Clause 4 is the recommendation of a statutory statement to give account of how the 
injmy or death occurred by a person having responsibility for a child at the time of 
those injuries. A number of respondents raised the question as to the statement's 
effectiveness 39 and this author would have to concur. The lacuna identified is one 
where there is at least an inference of presence at the relevant time by the person, or 
persons, having responsibility for the child. This is coupled to an absence of proof as 
to who did the actual act and a lack of proof that they were a party to a joint 
enterprise. Obviously the statement is not going to change that. Neither can it change 
the knowledge of any of those persons who are accused. Thus the question would 
have to be asked, as it was, 'what effect would making such a statement have?' The 
answer would appear to be very little. The accused that stays silent because of guilt is 
" R v Kingston [1994] 3 All ER 353 
38 Ibid. at p.364, per Lord Mustill, when speaking on the case of R v O'Connor (1979) 146 CLR 64 
Judge Jeremy Roberts QC, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Criminal Bar Association; see 
Law Corn 282 pam 6.36 
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exempt from saying anything, per the general rule against self-incrimination, 40 
notwithstanding the erosion of this general privilege by parliament. 4 ' However, if 
contrast is made between this statement and any of the statutory provisions 42 that 
qualif5i the privilege, it is apparent that the statement would amount to nothing more 
than one of 'moral perfection'. Further, if they are silent through fear then 
irrespective of any moral obligation, or statutory statement, nothing is going to 
change unless some positive form of protection is both supplied and strong enough to 
overcome that fear43 . The comments made by Baroness Hale of Richmond in 
Hasat in respect of duress have equal applicability in this regard. The 
recommendations by the Law Commission in the consultation report 45 at 6.12 under 
safeguards, appears wholly inadequate: 
Where the carer claims to be fearful of another suspect, it would be 
desirable for some consideration to be given to what could be done to 
allay such possible fears and to emphasise the importance of the 
responsibility to give an account despite these fears. 
In respect of the lacuna and any effectiveness upon it, with the utmost respect, such a 
statement achieves nothing. 
Clauses 5 and 6: Investigations by Police and Responsibility of Witness in 
Criminal Proceedinzs 
These Clauses deal with the procedural changes that are necessary to incorporate 
Clause 4. Having dealt with clause 4 and the remoteness of applicability to the 
lacuna, nothing further will be said in respect of Clauses 5 and 6; other than to note 
40 
 Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950; Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EFIRR 379, ECI-IR; AG's Ref (No.2 of 2004) [2004] LJKHL 43, 
[2005] All ER 273, see paras 9 and 21 at pp.246-247 and p.251 respectively, per Lord Bingham 
41 
 The guaranteed right is not absolute but and statutes imposing a duty to give evidence have been found to 
be compatible; e.g. Civil Evidence Act 1968 s14, Road Traffic Act 1988 s5; see Sheldrake v DPI' [2004] 
UKHL 43, [2005] All ER 273 
42 
 Criminal Evidence Act 1898, sI; Children Act 1989 s98; ci cii; see also Law Com 279 paras 3.38-3.52 
and more specifically the comments of Elizabeth Lawson QC in Re Al (Care Proceedings: Disclosure 
and Human Rights) [2001] 2 FCR 1316, Law Com 279 pam 3.49 
See Law Com 279 para 3.49-3.52 and the comments of Elizabeth Lawson QC in ReM (Care 
Proceedings: Disclosure and Human Rights) [2001] 2 FCR 1316 
R v Hasan [2005] EwHL 22, [2005] 4 All ER 685 at pp.712-713 and 715 
Law Corn 279 
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that Clause 6(4)(a) preserves the right of privilege, which is therefore pertinent to the 
comments just made in respect of clause 4. 
Clause 7: Special procedure during trial (Removal of the 'Half-Time' rule) 
In order for Clause 7 to come into operation it must be proved that a serious crime 
has been committed against a child and that a defendant who has responsibility for 
that child is identifiable, either individually or as being one amongst an identifiable 
group of defendants (or potential defendants). The reason for the inclusion of this 
definition will become apparent. Should the defendant with responsibility be entitled 
to an acquittal then clause 7 would cease to operate; but then equally charges under 
sl of the 1933 Act, the aggravated slA offence (proposed) and gross negligence 
manslaughter would founder also. 
The aim of this provision is however to give effect to the Law Commission's desire 
that where ordinarily a submission of no case to answer would bar the court from 
further enquiry, then this 'half-time rule' should be postponed in order for the 
defendants to give an account. The problem is that without the operation of 
something further, other than the injury or death of the child and the identification of 
the group, the rule at the root of the lacuna continues to be operative and silence by 
each and every defendant will remain a defiant hurdle. 
In their commentary on the operation of this clause, the Law Commission dismiss the 
recommendations of Ms Laura Hoyano 46 who suggests that the test ought to be the 
same as that which operates to take the case beyond the 'half-time rule'. The Law 
Commission rejected this because: 
These conditions are the trigger to the operation of a special procedure 
which will, amongst other things, deny the defendant the facility of 
seeking to have the case dismissed at the close of the prosecution case. 47 
46 
 Ms Laura Hoyano is a Fellow and Tutor at Wadham College Oxford; specialising in the"legal responses 
to allegations of child abuse, particularly in relation to the evidence in criminal prosecutions, and 
vicarious and primary tort liability for institutional abuse." 
Law Corn 282 para 6.58 
25 
Thus, to set the test which applies in all 'normal' cases would defeat the purpose of 
this 'special procedure'. The Law Commission however then go on to state that it is 
only the first condition of the clause that has to be proved to the requisite standard, 
namely, that: 
• . . the offence charged or any alternative offence has been committed (but 
it is not necessary for it to have been proved which of those offences was 
committed) .48 
So, provided there is a defendant who has a responsibility and provided that at least 
si of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 appears on the charge sheet, then 
the 'half-time rule' is to be postponed. There is however an additional hurdle in sub-
clause 3 and according to the Law Commission it is a 'substantial' one. In paragraph 
6.62 of their final report it is stated that the mechanism when operative will take the 
prosecution a long way down the road to establishing that it must have been one or 
the other, or the entire identified group who committed the offence. The Law 
Commission state that: 
It imposes the obligation on the prosecution to narrow the field of 
suspects so that they can all be described either by name, or by personal 
characteristics, or by their relationships [tothe victim. . . .but, it] will not 
apply where the question for the court is "are we sure it was the 
defendant, chosen from the whole world, who did it". 49 
But surely this is the prosecution's remit anyway and if the evidence is available to 
show that it is either an individual or the entire group who committed the offence 
then they have satisfied the court that there is a case to answer and Ms Hoyano's 
recommendation is surpassed, irrespective of any postponement of the 'half-time 
rule'. 
48 
 Law Corn 282 Clause 7(2) of the Offences Against Children Bill 2004 
Law Corn 282 pan 6.61 
Mi 
The Law Commission when talking on the operation of the expansive adverse 
inference at paragraph 6.98, state that section 35A(5)(b) of the 1994 Act, 5° as it 
would be, operates to remove the fourth technical requirement of the Cowan5 ' 
direction, to such extent that it might be characterised as 'establishing a case to 
answer' but the inference can not be drawn without a case to answer; Abbott 52 , 
Cowan53 , Doldur54, Mi/ford55 and per the Law Commission's Consultation Report at 
paragraphs 6.36 6.39.56 
The problem existent within the lacuna thus continues to return. If the prosecution 
have a number of defendants, even if one has a responsibility to the victim, the 
prosecution will fail to surmount the defence hurdle unless they can proffer either 
greater legal argument or evidence against the defendant. The first condition, clause 
7(2) as stated above, does not bolster the prosecution's case or their evidence. Silence 
remains a substantial defence, especially against the higher charges of manslaughter 
or an aggravated s 1 offence. Suspicion of a defendant's guilt remains just that 
suspicion. - 
Thus, the mechanism of clause 7 to abolish the 'half-time rule' is defective in these 
circumstances and will only operate to further burden the 'over-laden and underfed 
camel' that is the criminal justice system. 
Clause 8: Inferences from the accused's silence 
Clause 8 amends the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, in order to 
allow the jury to make an adverse inference against a defendant who has a 
responsibility to the child victim over and above a 'normal' s35 adverse inference. 
Once the court is satisfied that the defendant meets the requirements of responsibility 
and the 'half-time rule' has been postponed then this mechanism is automatically 
50 
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; See Appendix 5 at pp.93-94 
R vCowan [1996] QB 373 
R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497 
- R vCowan [1996] QB 373 
R v Doldur [2000] Crim LR 178 
v Milford [2001] Crirn LR 330 
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triggered. The Law Commission believe that the expanded adverse inference should 
operate because: 
the defendant bears the statutory responsibility [which is an] important 
element in enabling a jury to say that the circumstances disclosed by the 
evidence "call for an explanation from that defendant". 57 
The mechanisms that trigger the operation of this clause would, according to the Law 
Commission, negate the strict requirements of Cowan58 but it has already been shown 
that where there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the court then there is already a case 
to answer. Thus the requirements of Cowan59 are equally already meet. The Law 
Commission, however; appreciate that if there is not a case to answer and a non-
responsible defendant is released and a defendant with responsibility is left 'in the 
frame', then the jury may have sympathy for that defendant and without further and 
more expansive amendments the Law Commission accept that this brings about an 
anomaly. 6° But if there is no case to answer then surely it is perverse to convict a 
person of an offence; are we not reminded of the words Lord Goddard CJ in 
Abbott? 6 ' 
[A]lthough it is unfortunate that a guilty party cannot be brought to 
justice, it is far more important that there should not be a miscarriage 
of justice and the law maintained that the prosecution should prove its 
case. 62 
Therefore, if the lacuna exists then it exist here as it exists in all these types of cases 
and for this very reason. The anomaly that would be created is one of circularity in 
relation to a 'lack of proof. 
" Law Corn 282 pam 6.80 
R v Cowan [1996] QB 373 
Ibid. 
° Law Corn 282 pam 6.80 
R v Abbott [1955]2 QB 497 
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 Ibid. at pp.503 - 504 
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To give two contrasting examples: If the prosecution can prove that three people 
were in the house, where a child died an unnatural death and that one or two of the 
defendants had responsibility to the child, then they carmot satisfy the court to the 
requisite standard. Suspending the 'half-time' rule and placing those with 
responsibility under a duty to answer adds nothing to the prosecution's case. There 
remains sufficient doubt that no reasonable jury could bring a guilty verdict against 
any of them irrespective of whether the non-responsible party is removed. If 
however, the prosecution can prove that all three were in the same room as the child 
victim at the necessary time 3 then there is a natural inference that those with 
responsibility should give account, regardless of any statutory statement to that 
effect. But if there is no other evidence then the prosecution still fails despite these 
changes to the criminal process. The most that can be proved is a section 1 child 
cruelty charge under the 1933 Act, but only if there is a catalogue of abuse. In the 
circumstance of a single incident then there remains doubt in the face of silence or 
lies, as per the ratio in both Lane and Lane63 and Stnidwickf' The rationale within 
these examples is effectively confirmed by the Law Commission when they state in 
their commentary that: 
It means that the judge will have to consider, where asked, whether in the 
circumstances of the case it would be "proper" for the jury to be 
permitted to draw such an inference. 65 
The expansion of the adverse inference under s35 of the 1994 Act does nothing more 
than a 'normal' adverse inference; either practically, logically or linguistically. 
Clauses 9 - 13: Savin2s and interpretation 
Clause 9 limits the procedural and evidential effects of the Offences Against Children 
Bill 2004 to those mentioned within it, the remaining clauses are interpretive, as such 
no further discussion will advance this dissertation beyond that which has already 
been made. 
63 
 R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5; see also R v Watiam (1952) 36Cr App R 72 
MR v Strudwick (1994) 99Cr App R 326 
65 Law Corn 282 pan 6.86 
A Case Study: A Critical Analysis of the Law Commission's Proposals 
The following as stated in the introduction is a case study based on those cases 
identified by the Law Commission as being demonstrable of the lacuna. The 
incorporation of this case study is two-fold; the first is to determine the scope of the 
identified lacuna and the second, is to assess the effectiveness of the proposed 
provisions. In each of these cases the trial judge has always accepted the prosecution 
argument that there is a case to answer. 
R v Lane and Lane' 
The child at the centre of this case was the subject of a violent attack between the 
hours of noon and 8.30pm. The only defendants were those having a duty towards 
the child and neither defendant gave evidence. Thus the jury had to determine their 
decision based on their assessment of the prosecution case given the facts presented 
and the lack of any explanation from the defendants. Although, it was an established 
fact, that the defendants both had a 'general' custody of the child throughout the day, 
notwithstanding that they were individually but occasionally absent. Both defendants 
were found guilty of unlawful act manslaughter and cruelty of a child; "wilfully ill-
treats" under sl(l) of the 1933 Act. 2 The cruelty charge was based on three incidents 
occurring on the 30th 
 April, 17th 
 June, the l July 1983, the fatal assault occurring on 
the September formed no part of the cruelty charge. 
These facts would appear to bring the case of Lane and Lane3 well within the criteria 
proposed by the Law Commission. However, as stated when examining the 
proposals, silence or lies do not advance the prosecution's case or evidence and any 
adverse inference can already be seen to be operative in the decision of the jury when 
they found the Lanes guilty. The problem however is that while a general duty of 
care was admitted, the police investigation proved the absences claimed and as such a 
continual joint custody, as in Marsh and Marsh,4 could not be established. Further to 
this the prosecution specifically claimed that the cruelty incidences were not adduced 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5 
2 
 The maximum sentence of imprisonment under sI(I) at this time was 2 years 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5 
'Marsh and Marsh v Hodgson [1974] Crim LR 35 
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as similar fact evidence and rightly so. Lord Justice Croom-Johnson specifically 
states that the fatal injury was probably inflicted by a single blow, possibly as a 
single incident and no doubt in a very short space of time. 5 The effects of a statutory 
statement are non-existent for the reasons stated earlier in respect of lies and 
privilege. Besides this his Lordship also states that for any lack of explanation to 
point to guilt it has to be in circumstances that point to knowledge and therefore to 
the defendant's own fault. 6 
The case of Lane and Lane7 foundered due to the extremely wide 'window of 
opportunity' in respect of when the injury was inflicted and the fact that it was, 
almost undoubtedly a single incident. In fact Lord Croom-Johnson J makes this very 
point: 
At all times the prosecution were unable to show when it was inflicted, 
by whom it was inflicted, or how many people were present. 8 
Even the medical opinion supporting the cruelty charge is now open to some doubt. 
But to say that this creates a lacuna in the law is excessive. There is a deficiency of 
evidence, although not a complete absence of it, as such the case is one of 
misapplication of law per the second ratio. The provisions proffered by the Law 
Commission are highly unlikely to alter the decision in this case. 
R v Asian and Mason 9 
As with the case of Lane and Lane'° the prosecution based their case on a single 
incident; namely a rear body blow, consistent with a slam on to a hard surface or wall 
rather than with a fall. But at least in this case the defendants were in the flat at the 
relevant time, although not in the same room. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal 
v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R Sat pp.9 & 14 
6 ibid, a! p.14: See also the Law Corn 282 pans 6.62, 6.65 and 6.67 for cornrnentary which also points to 
this essential matter. 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5 
ibid. 
RvAston and Mason (1992) 94 Cr App R 180 
v Lane and Lane (1986)82 Cr App ItS 
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and again emphasized that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to properly 
conclude that: 
either A or M expressly or tacitly agreed that D should suffer physical 
harm; or that either had wilifilly and intentionally encouraged the other 
to cause injury to her.' 
Equally: 
- .there was no evidence that there was any opportunity for one to 
intervene in an attempt to stop the activities of the other vis-à-vis the 
baby. 12 
However Lord Lane CJ, who delivered the judgement, comments heavily on the trial 
judge's summary of the case to the effect that he erred in his assessment of the 
evidence. Looking at the facts presented in the case report, there is a strong indication 
that the mother was the principal and that she acted alone. The assault took place 
between 10.1 5am and 12.1 5pm' 3 thus, she had the opportunity and she had expressed 
a desire to be rid of the child.' 4 There is also 'similar fact' evidence existent in the 
injuries inflicted on her previous child, Karl, who suffered broken ribs and a subdural 
haemorrhage.' 5 
 Therefore, while the decision remains steadfast in its application of 
the Abbott' 6 principle (because of the way the case was pursued by the prosecution) 
actual analysis places it outside of the lacuna because there is evidence to show that 
potentially one rather than the other, or both, committed the crime. 
One element does need to be noted, the court whilst relying on the case of Abbott' 7 
only considered the case of, and therefore the principle in, Lane and Lane. 18 
 As such 
it must be asked whether there is a difference in the decisions of these two cases and 
the applicability of the principles to the facts; especially as Lord Justice Croom- 
"R vAston vMason(1992) 94 CrApp R 180 at p.181 
2 
 Ibid 
B 
 Ibid., at p.182, narrowed down from 12 hours by the occurrence of petechial haemorrhaging of the eyes 
' 4 lbid. at p.185 
"Ibid. at p.l82 
16 
 RvAbbott(!955)39CrAppR 141 
17 
 Ibid. 
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Johnson raised the questiornof why the prosecution had not pursued the case under 
'neglect' rather than 'wilfiully ill-treats'.' 9 
R vSandd ° 
This case also fails to fall within the lacuna, for the same reasons as Aston and 
Mason.2 ' The only difference here is that the jury acquitted the boyfriend and found 
the mother guilty. The convictions were found to be unsafe because the trial judge 
had erred in his sunimin-up. The reason no re-trial was ordered was because the 
Crown accepted that the acquittal of the boyfriend would have to be honoured, which 
would impact upon the presentation and effectiveness of evidence at any re-trial. 
Therefore to say that this case is one where there is no evidence and thus within the 
lacuna identified is erroneous. It might also be noted that Blackstone's Criminal 
Practice makes the following statement, which is supportive of the stance taken in 
relation to these two cases: 
Whether the evidence really does leave the question of which accused 
committed the offence in total doubt or whether there is evidence just 
capable of pointing to one or the other as the person responsible will 
depend on close analysis of the evidence in the particular case. 22 
R v Strudwick 23 
As noted in Lane and Lane24 for lies or any lack of explanation to carry adverse 
weight they must be said in a manner that points to knowledge or guilt. 25 In this case 
the trial judgerejected a plea of no case to answer, because: 
9 ThW at p.7 
20 
 R vS and C [1996] Crim LR 346 
2! 
 R v Aston and Mason [1991] Crim LR 701 
22 
 Blackstone's Criminal Practice, 2004, Oxford University Press, Oxford pan D14.30 
23 
 R v Strudwick (1994) 99Cr App R 326 
24 
 R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5 
25 /bid, at p.14; see above p.19 
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S admitted some violence towards the child and had told manifest lies 
from which the jury could infer that he was guilty of manslaughter. 
Similarly, [the mother] had seen the violence used by 5, and had lied. 26 
The Court of Appeal of course point out that 'the fact that people lie' does not 
advance the prosecution case. Equally it does not ifim 'no evidence' into 'some 
evidence' this can only be done with other evidence and the lacuna exists because of 
an absence of evidence. But the case for the prosecution was advanced on three 
fronts only one of which was based on the lies told, albeit to support the other two 
grounds. The first, being the contextual background of continual physical abuse by 
the defendants against the child. The second, being that there was an admitted assault 
by the first defendant against the child, which was witnessed by the second 
defendant. The fact that there is no definitive evidence to conclude that the 'tea-time' 
incident was in fact the actual incident when the fatal injuries were inflicted does not 
close the issue. The circumstantial evidence is strong and it is surely open to debate 
as to whether the jury would have drawn such a conclusion had it not been for the 
fact that the prosecution attempted to bolster this evidence by reliance on the lies told 
and the fact that the trial judge utilised this approach to reject the submission of 'no 
case to answer'. Further to this is the fact that Farquharson LJ states that the case has 
considerable similarities to the case of Lane and Lane27 and in respect to the telling 
of lies this author accepts that that is certainly the case. However in respect of 
responsibility and culpability there is, respectfully, a question of doubt. His Lordship 
states in his judgement that: 
There are cases in which the present problem is overcome if the 
presence of both accused can be established at the time the assaults 
took place. An example is to be found in Lawson and Thompson 
(unreported July 30, 1993) where the presence of both appellants was 
admitted at a time when the child victim was heard screaming by the 
next door neighbour. If of course evidence of that kind is available it 
avoids the problems which arise in the present appeal. 28 
R v Strudwick (1994) 99 Cr App R 326 at p.327 
27 
 R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App r 5 
28 .R v Strudwick (1994)99 CrApp R 326 atp.331 
34 
The inference to be drawn from this passage is questionable; would a witness hearing 
the child scream have made such a difference to the outcome of the case? The answer 
to that is doubtful, because it too does not advance the case, unless it is accepted that 
the tea-time incident was the actual occasion on which the fatal injuries were 
inflicted, in which case the need for a witness adds very little, especially as according 
to the headnote: 
[The defendants] admitted that the child was with them • in their 
caravan during the period when her fatal injuries must have been 
inflicted29 
This according to the commentary on Marsh and Marsh3° is sufficient to maintain a 
finding of joint enterprise and therefore a conviction of manslaughter, especially 
when the defendant's do not give a credible account of the injuries. Although this 
case was criticised by Croom-Johnson U in Lane and Lane3 ' the issue of presence at 
the time of the incident is substantially different as between these cases. The issue of 
presence and of previous acts perpetrated against the child is reinforced by the 
following case of Russe/l and Russell. 32 
In relation to the proposals and the lacuna, as stated above, lies will apparently defeat 
the statutory statement as such the advancement of the case past the submission of 
'no case to answer' would make no further headway unless there is other evidence 
which is contrary to the description of. the lacuna. If however, we accept the 
argument just advanced that there is evidence from which the jury can legitimately 
fmd defendants guilty then that too defeats the need for the proposals. It is submitted 
that this argument is also true of the new s5 offence under the Domestic Violence 
Crime and Victims Act 2004 because that offence stands or falls together with any 
charge for murder or manslaughter by virtue of section 6 subsections (3) and (4)•33 
29 /bid, at p.326; see also p.329 re the first defendant, and p.331 in relation to the second defendant. 
° Marsh and March v Hodgson [1974] Crim LR 35 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5 at p.  12, see Law Corn 279 pan 6.25 
R v Russell and Russell (1987) 85Cr App R 388 
" See Appendix 6 p.97  post 
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R v Russell and RusselP 4 
This case concerns the conviction of both parents for unlawthl act manslaughter by 
the administration of a lethal overdose of Methadone. Both parents were methadone 
addicts and had previously administered small amounts of the drug to their daughter. 
Unfortunately on the fatal occasion one, of them administered an excessive amount of 
the drug, however it could not be proved which one. The conviction according to the 
principle of the cases stated above should have been struck-out, on a strict 
interpretation, but the contrary in fact occurred and the conviction was upheld. The 
Law Commission cite this case as one where a joint enterprise, aiding and abetting, is 
inferred at the time of the fatal incident by reference to the previous activities of the 
defendants against the victim. This was of course, the first ground of liability 
advanced by Mr Camden-Pratt QC, in Strut/wick, 35 although it will be recalled that in 
that case the court held that there was no evidence once the reliance on lies was 
removed. Equally, a submission by one of the defendants that they were, or might 
have been, out of the room at the relevant time was rejected. The Lord Chief Justice 
actually states that Mr Russell: 
• . was almost certainly in the maisonette and almost certainly in the 
living roonilbedroom when the drug was administered 36 
A similar finding was made in Marsh and Marsh37 where the court held that the 
conviction was still sound, because: 
the injuries had been caused by human agency and that the 
defendants were jointly in charge of the child at the material time. 38 
This approach does raise problems in respect of the duty to give an account. If it is 
fblfilled, as per the Law Commission, when the person with responsibility says, 'I do 
not know what happened' because: 
R v Russell and Russell (1987)85 Cr App R 388 
R v Strudwick [1994] 99Cr App R 326 
36 
 R v Russell and Russell (1987)85 Cr App R 388 at p.394 
" Marsh and March v Hodgson [1974] Crim LIt 35 
Ibid. at p.35 
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"In our view this concern fails to give any, or any due, weight to the fact 
that the responsibility is to give such account as they can. Thus, if they 
were not present and are unaware of what occurred then they can 
discharge their responsibility by giving an account of where they were 
and why it is that they do not know what happened. It is the failure to do 
even that, particularly at trial, which may have adverse consequences for 
that person."39 
The problem becomes compounded by a circularity of logic and a lack of proof if the 
defendants lie, because unless the prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that they have lied, the defendants cannot be proved guilty as in Strudwick. 4° 
The principle of this case and its applicability to other case of this ilk is thrown into 
fUrther confusion by the fact that the court not only reiterates the principle in Abbott 4 ' 
but then goes on to states that: 
parents of a child were in no different position from any other 
defendants jointly charged with a crime, and that to establish guilt, the 
Crown must prove at least that the defendant aided, abetted, counselled 
or procured the commission of the crime by the other. The only 
difference in the position of parents was that one might have the duty 
to intervene in the ill-treatment of their child by the other, whereas a 
stranger would have no such duty. 42 
The case is much criticised by Professor Glanville Williams in 'Which of you did 
it?' 43 which is acknowledged by the Law Commission. 44 However it must be noted 
that Professor Williams' comments appear to be influenced by the fact that the 
Law Corn 282 pam 6.36 (original emphasis) 
40 
 R v Strudwick [1994] 99 Cr App R 326 
' R v Abbott (1955) 39Cr App R 141 
42 
 R v Russell and Russell (1987) 85Cr App R 388 at p393 
Glanville Williams, 'Which of you did it?' (1989)52 MLR 179 
Law Corn 279 para 1.31 and Law Corn 282 para 2.16 
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defendants were in all other respects dutiful and doted over their daughter and by his 
own reading of the case 45 rather than for its ratio or general applicability. 
The cases advanced by the Law Commission as being demonstrative of a lacuna 
which exists because there is no evidence to prove which of the two defendants 
committed the actual act, and equally, no evidence to prove a joint enterprise are, 
with respect, a disparate lot. - In Lane and Lane46 the defendants could not be shown 
to be at the scene of the crime at the relevant time. In Aston and Mason 47 the 
defendants were in the flat at the relevant time but not the same room, yet this fact is 
dismissed as irrelevant in the cases of Marsh and Marsh48 and Russell and Russell. 49 
Equally, the previous activities of the parents are deemed to be irrelevant in 
Strudwick ° but are active in Russell and Russell. 5 ' The fact that evidence potentially 
exists against one defendant, rather than the other, as was stated in S and C52 and 
which might be inferred from the report in the case of Aston and Mason 53 is illogical 
and erroneous when advanced to support a statement that no evidence exists to prove 
a charge against one rather than the other. As such none of these cases are devoid of 
evidence and none can accurately be said to fall within the lacuna. Even with the 
leading case of Lane and Lane54 both defendants were convicted of 'wilfully ill-
treating' the child. As such can it logically be determined that the fault, if it can be 
called such, lies with a failure of evidence? If there is no evidence then there is a 
defence in silence, which is acknowledged by the Law Commission. Equally, if the 
Law Commission expects that the imposition of a duty to give account should 
countenance a response by those with a responsibility, then it must be a breach of that 
responsibility that constitutes the 'evidence' against the defendants; as such evidence 
exists as opposed to the lacuna. Therefore, surely the answer lies within a rule of law 
and its subsequent application and not with a lack of evidence. This 'answer' will be 
explored within chapter 2. 
Glanville Williams, 'Which ofyou did it?' (1989)52 MLR 179 at p.191 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5 
R v Aston and Mason [1991] Crim LR 701 
Marsh and March v Hodgson [1974] Crim LR 35 
R v Russell and Russell (1987)85 Cr App R 388 
° R v Strudwick [1994] 99Cr App R 326 
R v Russell and Russell (1987)85 Cr App R 388 
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In respect to the Law Commission's proposals the fact that the aggravated offence 
requires a guilty verdict under section 1 of the 1933 Act and because that requires a 
realisation of the consequence, by virtue of the decision in Sheppard,55 then that 
means that the proposed offence does nothing more than duplicate the law of 
manslaughter. The imposition of a statutory statement is ineffective, because it fails 
to give any assurance to a defendant who fears violence and is equally defeated by 
lies. If the prosecution cannot adduce some evidence of the defendant's guilt or 
presence, irrespective of any adverse inference, the judge would still have to 
withdraw the case from the jurybecause no 'properly directed' jury could convict, as 
such the removal of the 'half-time' rule becomes futile. The conclusion therefore 
must be that the Law COmmission's proposals would have no effective change upon 
the outcome of the cases cited, or relied upon. 
" R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, IlL 
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Chapter 2: An Analyses of the Law to Determine the Scope of the 
'Lacuna' 
The lacuna identifies that there is no evidence to prove that either defendant 
comnitted the offence, and no evidence to prove a joint enterprise. It is however the 
aim of this chapter to argue that the law is capable of bringing about a conviction 
other than one under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. This 
is not to say that there will not be a controversial argument tabled. It is appreciated 
that some of the issues raised may require greater debate than is available within this 
paper, this is unfortunate but unavoidable the law in relation to fatal offences is not 
particularly clear, satisfactory nor stable.' 
Initial discussion will focus on the law of gross negligence manslaughter and the 
legal concept and scope of the 'duty of care', which is both a central component of 
the offence, as well as being a marshalling post for the recommendations of the Law 
Commission. To facilitate this discussion, once the elemental scope has been 
determined, then it will be necessary to examine the remaining requirements of the 
offence. This cannot be done without taking into consideration the convoluted 
historical development that forms the backdrop to the current interpretation of the 
leading case of Adomako. 2 A study will then be presented to assess the viability of 
sustaining a conviction for this offence, by applying the facts from the remaining 
cases relied upon by the Law Commission as proving the existence of the lacuna. 
The nature and extent of the 'duty of care' inherent within gross negligence 
manslaughter will also feature as a focal point when discussing unlawful act 
manslaughter and the nature and scope of joint enterprise. The reason for doing this 
is to determine any correlation or disparity between the two concepts: 'duty of care' v 
'joint enterprise'. 
Following the conviction of Andrew wragg and Damien Hanson the Law Commission is now seeking 
consultation in order to make proposals to redefine the homicide offences; The Times, Punishing 
Murder, Dec 21, 2005; Law Commission Consultation Report, A New Homicide Act for England and 
Wales, Law Cont 177, Nov 28, 2005 
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The Scope of 'Duty of Care' and Gross Negligence Manslaughter 
Backuround: A History 
The offence of gross negligence manslaughter has existed in a comparable form for 
at least approximately 280 years.' In Williamson, 2 it was stated that: 
To substantiate that charge, [indictment of murder, manslaughter per 
Coroner's inquisition] the prisoner must have been guilty of criminal 
misconduct, arising either from the grossest ignorance or the most 
criminal inattention. One or other of these is necessary to make him 
guilty of that criminal negligence and misconduct. 3 
As the name implies, the offence has as its base the concept of negligence. 
Culpability arises here when the negligence is gross and death has resulted. As a term 
of art, gross negligence did not start to appear until the mid 19 Century, as Crassa 
Negligentia.4 The offence is however, not without its conceptual problems, because 
while the extent of the negligence is described as gross, this is hardly precise and 
judicial attempts to clarif5, the matter have been equally vague. Lord Hewart CJ laid 
down the following test: 
.the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence 
of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between 
subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as 
to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving 
punishment5 
Notwithstanding its vagaries this test was utilised by Judges, however, it was not 
used alone the word 'reckless' has also be employed to describe the extent of the 
R v Burton (I 721)1 Stra 481, firing pistols in a Street, criminally negligent 
2 R v Williamson (1807)3 C & P635 
Ibid. at p.635. Williamson was actually acquitted, having acted to the full extent of his skill, and 
notwithstanding a misdiagnosis. 
R v Trainer (1864)4 F & F 105 at p.115 
'Bateman (1925) 19Cr App R 8at pp.11-12 
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negligence or breach, as emphasised by Lord Atkin in the case of Andrews. 6 This was 
not initially problematic even following the case of Cunninzham 7 in 1957, which 
linked the concept to the defendant's knowledge or understanding of the events 
surrounding the actus retes of the offence. However, in 1982 the two cases Caidwelfi 
and Lawrence9 unfortunately utilised the word, and therefore the concept, of 
'reckless' in an objective test. This had a consequential impact on the offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter; no doubt not helped by the fact that negligence as a 
civil tort also utilises an objective test. The House of Lords eventually rectified the 
situation and re-established the offence in Adomako.' ° Together with this resurrection 
came the reiteration of Lord Hewart CJ's test. However, this does not mean that there 
are no similarities between subjective and objective reckless manslaughter and the 
resurrected offence of gross negligence manslaughter. These similarities exist 
because of the relationship between the 'duty of care' and the breach of that duty 
when laid against a background of surrounding events. At this stage it is worth 
stating that although this discussion is focused on gross negligence manslaughter, the 
imposition of a 'duty of care' together with a breach of that duty leading to injury 
alone and not death may well lead to a prosecution under section 1 of the 1933 Act. 
The charge however invariably being couched in different terms, i.e. 'wilfully 
assaults' etc)' 
As a generality it is understood that there are certain relationships that automatically 
generate a 'duty of care' between the parties involved, for example, doctor/patient, 
and parent/ child being the most obvious, other situations might also be said to create 
a 'duty of care'. However, it really needs to be understood how and why these 
relationships create this crucial element, the parentichild relationship for instance 
might be thought to exist because of the existence of the natural bond, but not all 
parents bond with their children. Equally it might be said to be based on the moral 
6 
 Andrews v DPI' [1937] AC 576 at p.583 
R v Cunningham [1957] 2 Q8 396, [1957] All ER 412 
Metropolitan Chief Commissioner v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, [1981] All ER 961 
R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510 
v Adomako [1995] AC 171 
There is only one offence under this section, R v Hay/es [1969] 1 QB 364,53 Cr App Rep 36. Each 
verb describes a type of cruelty, as such the prosecution should select the most appropriate one in 
the circumstances: R v Beard (1987) 85 Cr App Rep 395 
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duty' 2 to care for our child because of their vulnerability.' 3 But the problem at the 
core of this paper demonstrates that parents can seriously injure or kill their own 
children; although there has been a dramatic shift in social conscience in this 
regard.' 4 There would of course be a thrther problem created if the duty were to arise 
from vulnerability alone because a wider proportion of the populace would be held 
accountable for their acts or omissions. 15 Because it cannot be said that the 'duty of 
care' arises out of either a moral, vulnerable or natural state, it therefore must arise 
out of a legal one, which is to say a law. Any of these issues may be the base of the 
law, but it is the law that is operative and not the base reason for it. This being the 
case, an exposition of how the law creates the imposition of a 'duty of care' has to be 
undertaken. 
Statute automatically places responsibility for a child on married parents, or to the 
mother alone where they are not married.' 6 The responsibility is one that cannot be 
simply avoided, for example by either, or both, parents merely walking out.' 7 
Section 2 of the Children Act 1989 also states that: 
Where more than one person has responsibility for a child, each of 
them may act alone and without the other (or others) in meeting that 
responsibility' 8 
2 
 Thejurisprudential argument as to whether morals forms any part of the law is of course a long one and 
well beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 
 For Judicial commentary on children as a vulnerable class, see the judgement of Baroness Hale in R.fizi 
the application of Williamson and others) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [ 2005] 
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By use of the word 'may' a strict interpretation means that the law places a joint 
responsibility on married parents. This does not apply to those not married, however, 
section 17 of the 1933 Act extends this statutory provision, by presumption, to those 
persons who have 'care' for a child, which extends this responsibility to a wide 
variety of familial situations; i.e. the step-father or boyfriend etc. This provision also 
extends the duty beyond immediate physical proximity in a similar manner to that of 
the Children Act 1989. As such, the recommendation to make it clear that a person 
should not be immune from prosecution if they place a child in a dangerous situation 
simply because the care arrangement ends, is nothing more than a reiteration of 
existing law ignorance of which is immaterial and does not constitute a valid defence, 
as seen in the case of Youden.' 9 
The common law also imposes a similar responsibility on people who voluntarily 
undertake a responsibility, this has occurred most noticeably in cases involving the 
care of an infirm adult, but the principle still applies, Marriot?° and Nicholls, 2 ' and 
extends to those persons who might be said to be one-step removed, as was the case 
of Dobinson in Stone and Dobinson. 22 The voluntary undertaking of a duty, 
theoretically at least, starts from the point when a person decides to give assistance, 
especially if the law can establish, or construct, a reliance by the victim onto the 
actions of the person who lends his assistance, as occurred in Wacker, 23 Ru lie/I24 and 
again Stone and Dobinson. 25 Although the law does not impose a duty, or liability, on 
a bystander per Coney26 and Allen, 27 and according to the latter case not even if they 
have a criminal intent. 
A manslaughter conviction has also been imposed on a person for failure to carry out 
a contractual duty, even when the victim was not a party to the contract, the well- 
' Johnson v Youden [1950] KB 544; Bowman v Evans [1964] Crim LR 601 
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known case of Pittwooc 28 being the prime example. This principle may well appear 
to be out of context given the current discussion. But the proposition has been made 
that the better interpretation might be: 
more accurately based on the breach of a duty ... his employers paid 
him to discharge. 29 
Pittwood omitted to close the level-crossing and lefthis place of employment, in light 
of this failure a carter was killed. The question raised by this case is: 'Why should a 
person employed to carry out a duty be placed in a more onerous position than a 
parent?' If it is, as Blackstone's suggests, to be based on the fact that he was paid, 
then it needs to be mentioned that the State pays parents to care for their children, by 
way of State benefit in one form or another. 3° Pittwood's absence from the scene at 
the relevant time needs to be noted and not just because he created an obvious and 
dangerous situation. This principle also underlies those who undertake a position or 
occupation where a 'duty of care' is normally expected; such as that imposed upon 
those in the police force or in the nursing profession. 3 ' 
As mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the creation of an obvious and dangerous 
situation equally creates a 'duty of care' under which the creator or defendant will 
labour if injury is caused, although obviously the injury in this instance must be 
death. Although the principle has a wider application, it is sufficient to give rise to a 
'duty of care' and thus liability, especially if the person with responsibility places the 
child in a situation he knows to be dangerous. A hypothetical situation of this type 
was raised in the discussion above when considering clauses 2 & 3, of the proposals. 32 
Having considered the situations that give rise to a 'duty of care' there needs to be a 
breach of that duty. However, in this regard, the fact that the child has died will, or 
IS 
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 Clauses 2 & 3 Failure to protect a child and the effect of intoxication; see p.9 supra 
should, immediately give rise to an investigation. 33 Where there is no evidence of 
independent third party involvement or death by misadventure 34 then the focus will 
turn to those with responsibility to give account. Failure to do so will raise suspicion 
and with evidence it might be expected a trial and prosecution. But, it must be 
remembered that suspicion alone is insufficient. This does of course narrow the 
identified lacuna. In relation to the offence of gross negligence manslaughter the 
breach of duty must occur when there is a 'risk of death'. 35 The breach of duty in 
these circumstances should result in a conviction for gross negligence manslaughter 
if it is found as a fact that the breach was an operative cause of. death. This 
determination of fact is of course a matter for the jury. But, the distinction between 
advertence and inadvertence is a fine one. As such Jefferson 36 states that it is possible 
that two juries may bring two differing verdicts because of this distinction. 37 It has 
already been mentioned that there is an overlap between the two different states of 
recklessness and gross negligence manslaughter. Equally, and possibly because of the 
previous authorities used and approved in Adomako, 38 there have been subsequent 
variations of the epithet used to describe the surrounding circumstance when the 
breach occurs. These issues will be examined in depth throughout this chapter. 
The last requirement to establish this offence is that the breach of duty and the 
defendant's actions must be said to be so gross as to warrant criminal• liability; per 
the earlier decision in Baleman39 and more recently Adomako. 4° However, according 
to Akerele'" the gross nature of the offence is not cumulative. But this does not mean 
that a person who repeatedly exposes a child to a dangerous situation is not capable 
of being charged with this offence; because each occasion would represent a singular 
and independent act, rather than a cumulative one. 
However see Law Corn 282, pans 2.32-2.34 
There may well be other similar situations the two examples given are not intended to be exclusive. 
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There is some discussion as to whether each element is a matter of fact for the jury. 
However, in relation to the issue at the centre of this discussion, the imposition of a 
duty of care is taken as being one of law; the cases presented by the Law 
Commission reflect this stance, and as such nothing thrther will be pursued in this 
regard. 
Adomako and Reckless Manslaughter 
The test to ascertain whether the accused is guilty is said to be an objective one. 
However, the test is that contained in Adomako 42 and not Ca/dwell, 43 so what is the 
difference? The Ca/c/welt4 test, although now expurgated from the law by the case of 
G', stated that: 
A person... is reckless.., if he does an act which creates an obvious 
risk.., and when he does the act he either has not given any thought to 
the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there 
was some risk involved and has none the less gone on to do it. 46 
This test comprised two parts: the creation of an obvious risk in the first part and the 
conduct of the defendant in relation to that obvious risk in the second. In relation to 
the second part Lord Diplock, who gave the judgement, also stated that: 
[Recklessness] includes not only deciding to ignore a risk of harmful 
consequences resulting from one's acts that one has recognised as 
existing, but also fails to give any thought to whether or not there is 
any such risk in circumstances where, if any thought were given to the 
matter, it might be obvious that there was. 47 
42 RvAdomako [1995] AC Ill 
Metropolitan Chief Commissioner v CaIdwell [1982] AC 341, [1981] All ER 961 
'Ibid. 
R vO [2004] AC 1034 
Metropolitan Chief Commissioner v CaIdwell [1982] AC 341, [198 I] All ER 961 at 967; see also Rv 
Goodfel/ow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23 and R i' Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493 
47 Ibid. at p.966 
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This passage establishes that the first part of the test is purely objective, which is to 
say determined by the application of the 'reasonable man' test, which is of course the 
anthropomorphic representation of a legal fiction. Lord Goff confirmed the objective 
nature of the first part in the case of Reid. 48 The test was not considered to be one of 
strict liability, because had the defendant thought about the risk and erroneously 
concluded that it did not exist, he would accordingly escape liability as recognised in 
the cases of Co/es49 and Merrick. 50 But following the earlier case of Shimmen 5 ' the 
extent of the gap was already apparent and it might be concluded that it was so small, 
that a defendant may have had an easier task placing Pelion upon Ossa. It is this 
difficulty that differentiates Adomak0 52 from Ca/dwell. 53 The test in the former, as 
stated earlier, is that: 
[In] regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant 
was so bad as in all the circumstances as to amount in the jury's 
judgement to a criminal act, or omission. 54 
This test allows the jury to weigh the defendant's conduct against all the 
circumstances, which means that they can take account of the defendant's knowledge 
and abilities. Thus the stupid, ignorant or personally inadequate are more likely to 
escape liability; their actions being capable of bearing the description of an 
unavoidable tragedy or an inadvertence, rather than an avoidable advertence. 
Ca/dwell55 was not so forgiving as demonstrated by the case of Elliott. 56 
The culpability of those of low intelligence and its relation to the central issue by 
analogy can be demonstrated by analysing the leading case with that of Stone and 
Dobinson.57 The defendant Stone who lived with his mistress Dobinson was also the 
brother of the deceased, who rented a room from him but who lived as a recluse 
' R v Reid [1992]3 All ER 673 
R vColes [1995] Cr App R 157 
° R v Merrick [1996] Cr App R 130 
Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Shimmen (1986) 84Cr App R 7 
52 R v Adomako [1995] AC Ill 
Metropolitan Chief Commissioner v CaIdwell [1982] AC 341, [1981] A]l ER 961 
' Ibid. at p.17l, see also p.1  87; see further, Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, I IthEd.,  Ormerod, 0., 2006, 
Oxford Press, Oxford, p.133 
Metropolitan Chief Commissioner v CaIdwell [1982] AC 341, [1981] All ER 961 
Elliott v C [1983] 2 All ER 1005, [1983] WLR 939; see also Rogers (1984)149 JP 89, sub nom 
(Stephen Malcolm) 79 Cr App R 334 
57 R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354 
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therein. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal did not uphold the 'duty of care' on either 
of these two grounds; i.e. receipt of money or familial relationship. Instead, they 
found the 'duty' to have occurred from an assumption of responsibility namely after 
it became apparent that the victim was ill and after Dobinson had attempted to are 
for her. Equally both Stone and Dobinson had made an attempt to find his sister's 
doctor but failed. The Court identified a specific date from which this duty ran, that 
being the date on which Dobinson and a neighbour had washed the victim and had 
found her to be living in the most squalid of conditions. It was their failure to 
summon help after this date that constituted support for the conviction and it 
mattered not that they were incapable of using a telephone. Jefferson in his 
observations on this case states in relation to this that: 
.presumably the law is that one must act as a reasonable person 
would have acted, not as a person of limited intelligence and so on 
would have acted. 58 
With respect, this is not the case; to impose such a condition would substantially alter 
the offence and resurrect the Ca/dive/i59 principle. The defendants' gross negligence 
is more accurately determined by reference to their own knowledge and lack of 
action. The fact that she was ill and in need of medical attention was known, 
notwithstanding Stone's exculpatory statement that he had not realised the extent of 
his sister's illness. Dobinson had, on the date from when the failure is measured, 
recruited the help of a neighbour and both defendants had commented to the landlady 
of their local pub about getting help, as such both had demonstrated their realisation 
and ability, limited though it was. There were numerous options within this limited 
field of ability that might have been pursued, including raising the issue with the 
visiting social worker. The conclusion is that in this regard, neither Stone nor 
Dobinson could claim to fall within that class of people described as stupid, ignorant 
or personally inadequate; the judgement thus beiig princely forged. The same 
application of subjective knowledge to gross failure, and therefore gross negligence, 
can be applied to Adomako. As an anaesthetist, Adomako knew what his duties were 
and that a failure to monitor adequately the patient's breathing and airway could have 
Jefferson M., Criminal Law, 7th 
 Ed., (2006), Pearson Education Ltd. Harlow at p.70 
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fatal consequences; as happened. In fact this subjective analysis of knowledge was 
stated by the Court of Appeal when discussing Adomako. 6° In this regard the fact 
that the House of Lords have effectively approved two apparently disparate 
statements to describe the circumstance under which the breach of duty occurs, 'risk 
of death' and 'injury to health and welfare' is not beyond reconciliation; in fact, by 
simply placing these statements against the background events, we can determine that 
they are merely descriptions used to emphasise the degree or gravity of any 
consequential breach. This approach can be affirmed by analysing the decision of the 
House in Adornak0 6 ' the first sentence describes the material characteristics of the 
offence: 
A defendant was properly convicted of. involuntary manslaughter by 
breach of duty if the jury were directed, and had found, that the 
defendant was in breach of a duty of care towards the Victim who died, 
that the breach of duty caused the death of the victim, and that the 
breach of duty was such as to be characterised as gross negligence and 
therefore a crime. 62 - 
The following, second sentence, describes that offence with reference to the specific 
case in issue: 
Whether the defendant's breach of duty amounted to gross negligence 
depended on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the 
defendant in all the circumstances in which he was placed when it 
occurred and whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the 
conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to 
amount in the jury's judgment to a criminal act or omission. 63 
In Litch/Ield, TM the accused attempted to assert that the principle in Adomak0 65 
required that the jury should be directed in terms, that his conduct should only be 
° R v Prentice and others [1993] 4 All ER 935 at 954 
61 
 R v Adomako [1995] AC 171 
62 
 Ibid. 
63 
 Ibid. 
MR v Litchfield [1998] Crim LR 507 
R v Adomako [1995] AC 171 
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described as a crime if he had demonstrated a lack of regard for the lives of others. 
However, given that he had created a dangerous situation by sailing too close to the 
rocks, which might not of itself have made his actions grossly negligent even when 
measured against the actions of a reasonably competent sailor or ship's captain; 
disregarding for the moment the application of maritime law. Once the defendant's 
knowledge in relation to the contaminated fuel is placed against the background of 
his reckless course then his conduct and the breach of duty become manifestly more 
culpable. In all these cases, the defendants need only have done a minimal act well 
within their capability to avert liability, thus it is their conduct and not the act or 
background per se that results in liability. Neither does this result in the creation of a 
purely subjective reckless manslaughter offence, that would only come about if for 
instance, Litchfield had sailed too close to the rocks whilst realising that it might be 
dangerous to do so. As such, gross negligence is neither subjective nor objective in 
nature; it has elements of both and occupies the ground between each. This is not to 
say that there is not an overlap. The fact that the overall assessment of the conduct 
and therefore guilt of the defendant is determined by the jury does not make the test 
an objective one. The inclusion of references to the reasonable man when applying 
the test is to 'navigate a Litchfield course'; it is fraught with danger and liable to 
founder on Caldwell rock. 
The state of mind of the defendant was considered in the Attorney-General's 
Reference (No.2 of 1999)66 
 by the Court of Appeal, which stated that: 
Although there may be cases where the defendant's state of mind is 
relevant to the jury's consideration when assessing the grossness and 
criminality of his conduct, evidence of his state of mind is not a 
prerequisite to a conviction for manslaughter by gross negligence. 67 
This passage was approved in DPP cx p Jones.68 It does not, however, mutate the test 
in Adoinak0 69 from that which has been asserted into an objective one. Exclusion of 
the defendant's state of mind, other than in cases where statute specifically dictates 
A-G's Ref. (No.2 of 1999) [2000] 3 All ER 182 
67 Ibid, at p.182 
68 
 R v DPI' exp. Jones [2000] IRLR 373 
69 RvAdomako [1995] AC 171 
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an objective test, such as Litch fIeld, 70 does not allow a jury to assess the seriousness 
of the defendant's breach of duty. But this is necessary to determine whether the 
defendant's conduct should be categorised as criminal and this so even with or 
without the inclusion of the statement 'in all the circumstances' as contained in the 
second sentence of the judgement. 7 ' Tnclusion of the defendant's state of mind may 
also be relevant to the background events. Ian Dennis 72 describes three theories of 
'fact finding', 73 the third being that of 'Narrative and Story-telling',74 which while 
using a holistic approach also allows the jury to reason individually and collectively. 
The other advantage or disadvantage of this theory is its retention of 'jury equity'. 
Which not only lies at the heart of the constitutional issue of trial by jury, but which 
would also appear to be at the heart of this test. Lord Bingham CJ in Sawoniuk stated 
that: 
Criminal charges cannot fairly be judged in a factual vacuum. 75 
The Hypothetical Scenario of Liability 
In relation to the situations central to this discussion and the hypothetical scenarios 
advanced to emphasize parental responsibility and liability, this interpretation of the 
law on gross negligence manslaughter has concomitant application. The rule in Lane 
and Lane76 and its precursor in Abbot? ' that presence alone does not automatically 
give rise to immediate liability remains intact. For example, is a parent who takes a 
child to the park to play on the swings and to feed the ducks, liable for a charge of 
gross negligence manslaughter should the child accidentally drowns? Or is the loss 
punishment enough? Equally, what if that same parent in these circumstances sees 
° R v Litchfield [1998] Crim LR 507, under s27(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970 (Repealed) 
Whether the defendant's state of mind works for or against him does not mean that it should simply be 
excluded, without some overarching justification; see R v DPP exp. Jones [2000] IRLR 373 and R 
(Rowley) v DPP [2003] EWUC 693 
72 
 Dennis, L, The Law of Evidence, 2"  ed., (2003 reprint), Sweet and Maxwell, London 
Ibid. atppl03 - 122 
Ibid. at ppl 16 - 122; The theory presented is acknowledged to be dependant on the works of Pennington 
and Hastie, 'The story mode! for juror decision making' in Hastie, Inside the Juror, 1993, Cambridge. 
The other two are based on Wigmorean Analysis (pp. lOS - 108) and Mathematical Model Theories 
(pp.108 - 116), the latter includes a discussion based on Bayes' Theorem, from its notorious legal 
inclusion in the Californian case of People v Collins (1968)438 p 2d 33, to the short shrift it received the 
in English case of Adams (Dennis) [ 1996] 2Cr App R 467 
Sawoniuk [2000] 2 Cr App R 220, CA at p.234 
76 
 R v Lane and Lane(1986) 82 Cr App R5 
77 RvAbbott(1955)39CrAppR 141 
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the child fall into the duck pond and makes an inept or futile attempt to rescue the 
child, or fails to have someone else intervene for having a morbid fear of water, are 
they to be considered grossly negligent? 78 Does the stigmatisation as a killer 
accurately reflect the negligence involved? 79 What if that same parent sees their child 
fall into the water, or notes that the child is in the water and does nothing, either 
recklessly or negligently, to remedy the situation, does this amount to gross 
negligence? Or is it open for debate? Any of these situations might constitute some 
form of culpability, but if the child shows signs of distress or is unconscious in the 
water when the parent detects the predicament and, does nothing, surely their 
culpability rises. Should it also be shown that the child cannot swim, is inherently 
clumsy and accident prone while having an absolute fascination with ducks, water 
and all things aquatic, then the lack of response has a greater attachment of 
culpability and the attachment of criminal stigma potentially becomes less abhorrent 
when the child is found to have died. Ultimately, of course, the decision is one for the 
jury, but the question of where on this spectrum of events we place, 'injury to health 
or welfare' or 'risk of death', is obscure and difficult to answer. But it does not mean 
that a finding of gross negligence manslaughter is beyond reason. On the other hand, 
it does question the Court of Appeal's ruling that gross negligence manslaughter 
requires 'foresight of death' as was stated in the case of Misra. 8° 
Croom-Johnson LJ in Lane and Lane8 ' questioned why the prosecution had not 
pursued the case under a charge of neglect, 82 rather than as a charge of unlawful act 
manslaughter based on a singular incident, especially when there were separate 
charges of 'wilfully ill-treats' under section 1 of the 1933 Act; which were based on 
three previous and separate incidents. While it is speculative to contemplate the 
possible outcome of the case had the prosecution sought to base the whole of their 
argument on neglect, it is not unreasonable to hypothesise that the defendants would 
still have been found guilty. Following this comes the question of whether a 
conviction of gross negligence manslaughter would have withstood examination, 
' R v Van BuIcliell (1829) 3 C & p 629 (genuine attempt to cure patient; not manslaughter); see also K 
vKnock(1877) 14 Cox CCI 
The Law Commission's express similar views in this regard; see Law Corn 282 para 6.24 
80 
 R v Misra [2004] EwCA Crirn 2375 
" R v Lane and Lane (1986)82 Cr App R 5 
' Ibid. at p.7 
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given that the charge of unlawfiul act manslaughter failed. Given the facts (the 
previous abuse over the summer, being background and not used as cumulative 
liability) it is not a great step to ask, whether: 
the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of 
compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life 
and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and 
conduct deserving punishrbent 83 
Applying the Bateman 84 test, or by asking whether the defendants had placed their 
child in an obviously dangerous situation, according to the standards of a reasonable 
man, by either not giving the situation any thought, or by having thought about it and 
nevertheless gone on to run that risk. It is not unreasonable to assume that the 
defendant's failed to do that which they should or ought to have done. This is a 
modified Caldwelfi 5 test, to take account of physical injury, rather than damage to 
property. 
The Bateman86 test, like the Adomak0 87 test, is satisfied by application of the 
foregoing argument. The Ca/dwelt8 test, however, creates another dilemma; would 
the reasonable man have realised that the situation in which the child was placed was 
dangerous? On the surface it would not appear so. However, following the first 
instance of abuse, would the reasonable man have stayed with the abuser? The 
answer to this may be 'yes'; but it would no doubt be modified by the caveat, 'do 
that again and! leave'. The reasonable man, it is asserted, does not allow a child to 
be abused. Further more the child in Lane and Lane89 was 22 months old, and 
Martin B. in Griffin 90 , states that: 
Bateman (1925) 19Cr App R 8 at pp.! 1-12 
" Ibid. 
Metropolitan ChiefCommissionervCaldwell [1982] AC 341, [1981] All ER 961; which has been 
included because it was the favoured approach at the time of the Lane case 
' Bateman (1925)19 Cr App R 8 
87 RvAdomako [1995] AC 171 
Metropolitan Chief Commissioner v Caldwel! [1982] AC 341, [1981] All ER 961 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82Cr App R 5 
R v Griffin (1869) Xl Cox CC 402 
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The law as to correction has reference only to a child capable of 
appreciating correction, and not to an infant two years and a half old. 
Although a slight slap may be given to an infant by her mother, more 
violent treatment of an infant so young by her father would not be 
justifiable.. 
We might also add that, the reasonable man is assumed to be law abiding. While 
there is authority to state that a defendant having a 'duty of care' is not guilty of 
manslaughter by virtue of his absence, 92 there is other authority to state that if both 
defendants are at fault then both are culpable. 93 As such the fact that one is absent 
should not alter the verdict. 
In relation to the case of Strudwic0 4 
 the second count was related to the period 
between the infliction of the fatal injuries and the child's death. Given that it was 
based on wilful neglect, it would appear to follow the judgement in Stone and 
Dobinson.95 
 There should be little difficulty therefore, in sustaining a charge of gross 
negligence manslaughter provided the hurdle in Lowe 96 can be surmounted. 
Lowe:A bar to stop at 
Lowe 97 
 is authority to the effect that a conviction for manslaughter does not 
automatically follow because the defendant has been convicted of 'wilful neglect' 
under section 1 of the 1933 Act simply because that neglect caused the victim's 
death. Blackstone's Criminal Practice 98 identifies the fact that: 
..it may sometimes do so if, for example, if there is proof of an intent 
to harm the child through such neglect. 99 
' Ibid. at p.403 
91 RvAIlen(1835)7C&P153at156;RvGreen(1835)7C&p156 
R v Haines (1847)2 Car & Kir 368; R v Benge (1865)4 F & F 504 at 509 per Pigott B; R vSalmon 
(1880) 6 QBD 79; See also R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App Rep 134 
R v Strudwick (1994) 99 Cr App R 326 
R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354 
R v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [1973] All ER 805 
' Ibid. 
Blackstone's Criminal Practice, 2004, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Ibid. pan A 1.13, where it is also identified that deliberate starvation may be murder; Gibbons and 
Proctor(1918) 13CrAppRI34 
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Ormerod, as editor of Smith and Hogan,' °° states that Lowe' ° ' has been overruled by 
Sheppard'02 as regards the 1933 Act. However, he also draws attention to the 
anomaly that Senior' 03 was disapproved by the court in Lowe' 04 but has been 
rehabilitated in part by Sheppard.'°5 Lowe' 06 however, remains the law on this point 
despite being overruled and having similar facts to Senior.' °7 
This knot of confusion is not conducive to the pursuit of a manslaughter charge, 
especially as Sheppard'°8 held that: 
• .although failure to provide adequate medical care was deemed by s 
1(2)(a) [of the 1933 Act] to amount to 'neglect' it was not deemed to 
amount to 'wilful' neglect, and therefore the prosecution was required 
to prove not only that the child did in fact need adequate medical care 
at the relevant time but also that the parents had deliberately or 
recklessly failed to provide that care. t09 
Both Lowe" ° and Senior" t concern the death of a child through the non-provision of 
medical care; adequate or otherwise. So, can the knot be undone, the bar passed and 
the principles reconciled sans torture? 
Senior was a member of a religious sect known as the Peculiar People. They believed 
fervently in the power of prayer and a strict interpretation of the scriptures. Life and 
death being God's prerogative and any resort to medical treatment was construed as 
an interference with divine will. The Jury found Senior guilty of manslaughter. On 
the other hand, Lowe realised that the child needed medical attention, and stated on 
two separate occasions to the child's mother that she should take the child to the 
°° Smith and Hogan. Criminal Law, I IthEd.; 
 Ormerod, a, 2006, Oxford Press, Oxford, p.478 
'°' R v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [1973] All ER 805 
102 R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, HL 
103 R v Senior [1899] QB 283 
104 R v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [1973] All ER 805 
R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, HL 
06 
 R v Lowe [1973] Q8 702, [1973] All ER 805 
'° R v Senior [1899] QB 283 
'° R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, HL 
'° Ibid. 
v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [1973] All ER 805 
R v Senior [1899] QB 283 
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doctors. Instead she lied to him and it was this deceit and the subsequent lack of 
medical attention that prevented the child receiving the attention she needed. This 
point was acknowledged by the court in the 1973 judgement. Originally the jury were 
asked to determine whether Lowe was guilty of unlawfully causing death; i.e. 
manslaughter. Their verdict was that he was not guilty. The jury were then asked 
whether he was guilty of 'wilful neglect' in respect to section 1 of the 1933 Act to 
which the jury returned a guilty verdict. This was a decision well within their 
jurisdiction; notwithstanding that the House of Lords have now overruled the 
conviction. There was then a direction by the trial judge that the jury, by law, had to 
find the defendant guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, i.e. by construction, but in 
this regard, there was no act. In relation to overall effect, the decision to 
overturh the judge's ruling on construction is correct for two reasons. The first is that 
the direction usurped the function and jurisdiction of the jury. The second is the 
inference that because a child dies as a result of wilful neglect there is an automatic 
assumption that an offence of manslaughter has been committed. It is of course the 
latter to which the judgement was aimed and which is a valid principle that still 
stands in both respects. The House of Lords in Sheppard" 3 overturned Lowe's 
conviction because there was equally no direction by the trial judge that Lowe was 
wilful as to the consequence of the neglect under section 1, had there been then the 
jury's decision would be final. Lowe's will was overshadowed by the Mother's 
deceit which constituted a novus actus interveniens. There is, therefore, no distortion 
of the law by application of the principle in Lowe." 4 In fact it is harmonious with the 
findings in both Senior" 5 and Adomako." 6 The facts of Senior' having been stated, 
demonstrates that where a parent, for whatever reason, wilfully neglects a child they 
can be found guilty of a section 1 offence under the 1933 Act and if, as in Senior," 8 
that neglect is considered gross, then the jury is then at liberty to determine that the 
parent, or responsible person, has committed a crime warranting the stigma and label 
v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [19733 A]t ER 805 
' R v Sheppard[I981] AC 394, HL 
R v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [1973] All ER 805 
R v Senior [1899] Q8 283 
116 R v Adomako [1995] AC 171 
117 R v Senior [1899] QB 283 
R v Senior [1899] Q8 283 
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attached to a conviction for manslaughter. The conclusion therefore is that Lowe' 9 
 is 
not a bar to placing before the jury a charge of gross negligence manslaughter. 
Having demonstrated that the law of gross negligence manslaughter is determined 
purely by examination of the background scenario with reference to the defendant's 
knowledge and state of mind and the obvious risks to the victim, the defendant's 
culpability can be weighed and measured accordingly. The fact that there may be 
other persons whose acts are equally negligent and operative at the time does not 
constitute a nous actus interveniens, because that would defeat the laws application, 
as stated in Benge.' 2° Equally, the law can find more than one person guilty of gross 
negligence manslaughter whether they are present throughout or not, per Stone and 
Dobinson.' 2 ' The question must therefore be asked, 'is there a correlation between 
the 'duty of care' at the centre of gross negligence manslaughter and the concept joint 
enterprise, in order to establish the offence of unlawfhl act manslaughter?' 
119 R v Lowe [1973] QB 702, [1973]AII ER 805 
v Benge(l865)4 F & F 504; however contrast R v Trainer (1864) 4 F & F 105 
121 R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354 
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Unlawful Act Manslaughter and the Joint Enterprise 
Unlawful Act Manslau2hter 
Unlawful act manslaughter, like gross negligence manslaughter, is open to critic jsm 
because of the construction of the offence from a base unlawful act. The defendant 
needs only the mens rea for that basic act, rather than a specific mens rca. If 
however, it can be shown that the defendant realised a 'risk of serious harm" though 
not wishing to injure, harm or hurt anyone, and continues to run that risk then it 
might more accurately be described as subjective reckless manslaughter, but 
invariably he has either committed some base crime or created a dangerous situation 
from which a 'duty of care' can be constructed; by either route and without such 
'construction' people would remain unaccountable for a death caused by their action 
or omission. 
According to Lord Hope 2 , unlawful act manslaughter comprises three elements: 
i) An unlawful act, intentionally performed; 
ii) In circumstances rendering it dangerous and 'likely to cause harm'; 
iii) Causing death. 3 
The unlawful act at the centre of the cases in issue are usually either assault or 
neglect or both. The first issue therefore, would appear to be satisfied, but the 
problem arises from the fact that neglect is not an act for the purposes of this offence. 
This means that because there is no direct evidence to prove that both or all the 
The 'risk of serious harm' has been used to differentiate between the requirements needed when lending 
oneself to an unlawful enterprise where such injury is potentially foreseeable, Powell and English [1999] 
AC I, R v Slack [1989] QB 775, Cr App Rep 252, and C/ian Wing-Siu v R[ 1985] AC 168, and 'risk of 
death' per R v Adomako [1995] AC 171; However, in R v C/zuch [1966] I QB 59 followed R v Le Brim 
[1992] QB 61, the act needs only be one involving 'some harm'. 
2 
 A-G's Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245; there actually four, but the fourth is merely a cumulative 
of the preceding three 
Ibid. at p960; see also Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, I l °'Ed., Ormerod, D., 2006, Oxford Press, 
Oxford, p.472 
defendants assaulted the victim, the lacuna is formed and unless there is proof of a 
joint enterprise the lacuna widens. 
The circumstance of the child's death usually indicates harm inflicted by human 
agency and once this is demonstrated and death results from this harm (be it physical 
injury4 or poison5) then the offence is made out; notwithstanding issues surrounding 
causation and the 'but for' rule 6 which are beyond this paper's remit. The task 
therefore is either prove joint enterprise, which according to the lacuna and the cases 
used in support of its existence cannot be done. Or, reconcile the two exceptions to it, 
i.e. the cases of Russell and Russell 7 and Marsh and Marsh1 8 and the use of 'joint 
custody and control' with the principle ofjoint enterprise. 
Elements and Scope of Joint Enterprise 
The term joint enterprise is used to describe a common venture which has been pre-
planned and where the parties know the role and extent of their individual tasks 
within that endeavour. However, the Judicial Studies Board states that: 
The words 'plan' and 'agreement' do not mean that there has to be any 
formality about it. An agreement to commit an offence may arise on 
the spur of the moment. Nothing need be said at all. It can be made 
with a nod and a wink, or a knowing look. An agreement can be 
inferred from the behaviour of the parties. 9 
There is therefore, some overlap with the notion of complicity. However, given that 
the defendant in each case must be proved to have the requisite mens rea and must in 
R v Strudwick (1994)99 Cr App R 326 
Drug overdose, It v Russell and Russell (1987) 85 Cr App R 388: Administration of excessive amounts of 
salt, R v Gay and Gay, worcester Crown Court Ref T20037208 (At the time of writing, an appeal was 
being launched on the grounds of fresh medical evidence to the effect that the child had a medical 
condition which was not disclosed during the original trial). 
6 
 Causation is a complex area of law which may be divided into two distinct parts, actual cause. Dalloway 
(1847) 3 Cox CC 273, and legal causation, Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670 both elements must he proved. 
R v Russell and Russell (1987)85 Cr App R 388 
Marsh and Marsh v Hodgson [1974] Crim LR 35 
Judicial Studies Board website, online reference, criminal law, specimen directions, general. 7 joint 
responsibility: http://www.jsboard.co.uklcriminallaw/cbb/mf02a.htm#08  
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some way lend assistance by aid or encouragement the term joint enterprise has been 
employed to represent the defendant's participation. 
The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, section 8 as amended, states that: 
Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of [any 
indictable offence], whether the same be [an offence] at common law 
or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be 
tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender. 
In relation to the issues in this paper, we need only focus on the first two elements 
under this section, namely aid and abet, because they are the elements that have 
formed the focus of the cases utilised by the Law Commission when presenting their 
proposals. The statute does not give any assistance in relation to what constitutes 
aiding and abetting, nor what type of mens rea is required of the accessory when they 
lend themselves to the enterØrise,' ° for this we need to look to the common law. 
The first question that needs to be asked is, 'does the accessory have to do a physical 
act to aid and abet'? The cases in point would appear to state that they do. 
Croom-Johnson U in Lane and Lane" talks of 'active consent' 12 M Aston and 
Mason, 13 
 Lord Lane CJ stated that, 'there was no evidence to prove the opportunity 
to intervene in the assault against the baby'. Impliedly this means that presence and 
active encouragement are elements in accessorial liability. The bystander is not liable 
and the case of Coney' 4 is authority for this proposition, but differentiations can be 
made according to the background or circumstance. In Du Cros,' 5 the defendant was 
the proud owner of a Mercedes which had been driven recklessly, but the court was 
faced with the dilemma of who was driving, Du Cros or the Lady of the case, Miss 
Victoria Godwin. 
The Accessory and Abettors Act 1861, does not create an offence per se 
'I RvLaneandLane(1986)S2CrAppR5 
'2 Ibid. at p.12 
13 
 R vAston and Mason [1992] 94Cr App R 180 
14 
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The Court held that Du Cros: 
• . .had become an accomplice by failing to exercise the control over 
the driver that he, as owner, could have exercised.' 6 
In fact the headnote in Du Cros'7 uses language, which is to the same effect, as the 
recommendations of the Law Commission and that enacted in the Domestic Violence 
Crime and Victims Act 2004. Du Cros, being in control of the car, could and ought 
to, have prevented it, is comparable with s5(1)(d)(i): 
• .at that time there was a significant risk of serious physical harm 
being caused to V... D was, or ought to have been, aware of the risk 
mentioned... [and] failed to take such steps as he could reasonably 
have been expected to take to protect V from the risk... 
Although Lord Alverston CJ states: 
I will not attempt to lay down any general rule or principle, but having 
regard to these findings of fact, it is, in my opinion, impossible to say 
that there was in this case no evidence of aiding and abetting on the 
part of the appellant.' 8 
We can see the principle in Du Cros,19 despite Lord Alverston's words, being applied 
in other cases such as Russell and Russell20 and Marsh and Marsh.2 ' However, 
Glanville Williams asks: 
which of these verbs (aids, abets, counsels and procures) fits the 
owner who has simply failed to check dangerous driving? My answer 
would be, none of them. The decision extends the notion of complicity 
to a case where there is no proof of encouragement, or a direct 
16 
 Ibid see also Marsh and Marsh v F-lodgson [1974] Crim LR 35 
17 
 Ibid. 
IS 
 Du Cros v Lambourne (1907) KB 40 at 46 
19 
 Ibid. 
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intention to encourage, or of help. Not of encouragement, because the 
ordinary driver would not expect to be checked and criticised by a 
passenger, even the owner who is sitting in the car. Many people are 
reluctant to criticise others to their faces; they would rather be silent 
and try to see that it the situation is not repeated. It is therefore 
unjustifiable to assume that the owner's silence about the driver's 
manner of driving was taken by the driver as an encouragement to 
continue. 22 
He also raises the question: 
• . .would it be absurd to say that a father who stands by while his son, 
aged 13, rapes a girl of similar age is guilty of rape.23 
By analogy, this author would say that it is neither absurd nor perverse to convict the 
father. This is because the father continues to have a duty of control over his son, 
even if there is no duty of care in relation to the girl. If the father understands that the 
girl does not consent 24 to the act he is witnessing then his presence becomes an 
'active' encouragement despite his omission to act. Nobody today would question the 
conviction of a father for allowing his 13 year-old-daughter to be raped, especially if 
he stood-by to watch. In the case of Clarkson,25 a rape case involving seven Gunners 
of the Royal Artillery, it was held that on a charge of aiding and abetting an offence 
on the basis of continuing and non-accidental presence during its commission, the 
prosecution had to establish that the defendants not only intended to encourage, but 
also actually encouraged the offence. 
However, Lord Megaw J states that: 
On no view can the conduct of any of them be regarded as other than 
deplorable... To say that those who attacked her behaved like animals 
22 
 Williams G., Which of You Did It?, (1989)52 MLR 179 at p.181 
23 
 ibid. at p.1  82, italicized in the original 
24 
 A discussion on the issues of consent and the offences under the Sexual Offences Acts is beyond the 
scope of this paper; suffice to say that no consent, actual or legal, is sufficient 
25 
 R v Clarkson and others [1971] 3 All ER 344 
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would be unjust to animals. . . .The only thing to be said in their favour 
is that they may have been in a drunken condition when their moral 
sense and sense of the requirements of human decency had left them 26 
His Lordship also cites the well-known passage of Hawkins J from the case of 
Cone-/7 , re the bystander, but we need to take note of these words from that passage: 
But the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present 
witnessing the commission of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, 
though he might reasonably be expected to prevent and had the power 
so to do, or at least to express his dissent, might under some 
circumstances, afford cogent evidence upon which a jury would be 
justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged and so aided and 
abetted28 
Thus it may constitute aiding and abetting to be reckless or indifferent to the 
consequence of one's assistance or encouragement in relation to the victim, as per the 
case of Gamble. 29 Notwithstanding that mere presence alone does not constitute 
aiding and abetting, 3° given the caustic remarks of Megaw U, above, and the 
principle of Du Cros,3 ' it may also be reasoned that had one of the soldiers a greater 
duty of control over the others he may have also been found guilty for his failure to 
intervene even if he had been 'heavy with drink'. In Morgan32 the husband was held 
liable as an accessory to his wife's rape even though at the time he could not have 
been convicted of rape, also in the case of Russell, 33 a husband who watched his wife 
drown their children was found guilty as a secondary party. The decision to allow the 
appeal in Clarkson34 as in many cases, was because the Court was of the opinion that 
the direction, read as a whole, might have lead the Court Martial to: 
26 
 R v Clarkson and others [1971] 3 All ER 344 at 346 
27 
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28 
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Russell [1933] VLR 59 
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.have misunderstood the relevant principle that ought to be applied. 35 
The soldier's failure remained disgracefUl and potentially unlawflul, because the 
Appeal Court had: 
.no doubt that the inferences could properly have been drawn in 
respect of each defendant.., so that verdicts of guilty could properly 
have been returned. 36 
Thus far all the defendants in these cases have been present; but the cases 
demonstrate that the law can and has found that presence alone might constitute 
encouragement by inference from the circumstances and no doubt the gravity of the 
crimes committed. Therefore in respect of what Glanville Williams has stated, the 
likelihood of a conviction and the vilification of the father, as an accessory is highly 
probable. Failure to exercise control can give rise to liability; Marshall should have 
protected his wife, notwithstanding that he was a superior officer. This establishes a 
proposition that the law differentiates between defendants and places them in 
superior or inferior categories. A mere bystander is not exposed to liability because 
he has no duty to the victim, has not created a dangerous situation, or allowed a 
situation of his own making to continue; as per Miller.37 This proposition is also 
supported by the fact that Stone and Dobinson 38 and Benge 39 were held liable, but 
Trainer40 was acquitted and the railway company blamed and by the fact that persons 
considered stupid, ignorant and personally inadequate (see Sheppard' and by 
extension Adomako, 42) are exempt from liability. 43 Thus the parents have a greater 
duty to the child than anyone else; but this is not to say that the others who fail in 
ibid. at p.349 
ibid. at p.349 
R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161, [1983] All ER 978 
R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354 
R v Benge (1865) 4 F & F 504 
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MI 
their responsibility are not beyond reproach, as witnessed by the cases of Dvi ham 44 
and Russell . 45 
Failure to exercise control when present can give rise to liability in the absence of 
exculpatory explanation. Equally in these circumstances if the aiding and abetting is 
implied then the 'active consent' is implied also. But distinctions can still be drawn, 
as per Morgan,46 which might be described as a case of active participation compared 
to the case Du Cros47 who omitted to exercise control. But in Clarkson48 there was 
neither a duty of care, nor control, nor direct evidence of active participation by some 
of the defendants. However, the Judicial Studies Board also makes this point: 
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to prove guilt, but 
if you find that a particular defendant was on the scene and intended 
and did by his presence alone encourage the other(s) [in the offence] 
he is guilty. 49 
Thus the fact that a person has failed to exercise control does not of course mean that 
he aids and abets a crime, because not only must there be some knowledge (i.e. they 
must realise that the crime is or might be committed) the law actually requires that 
the mind of the defendant goes with that crime. If the acts perpetrated against the 
child are substantially different then the defendant would not be a party to that crime; 
as per the ruling Powell and English.50 There are however, finite distinctions between 
whether the participant's activities fall within the scope of the joint enterprise. The 
House of Lords' decision in the case of Powell and English5 quite clearly states that 
the requisite mens rea for accessorial liability is subjective foresight of the possible 
resultant consequence of the principal's action and it matters not whether the act, or 
omission, by the accessory is substantial or trivial: Giannetto.52 Equally, the element 
of subjective foreseeability does not correspond with the mens rea of the principal 
R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 
Russell [1933] VLR 59 
DPPvMorgan[l976]AC 182 
Du Cros v Lambourne (1907)1(840 
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offence; the rationale for this being founded on the grounds of public policy and 
socio-legal need. 53 The defendant need only realise that their activity aids and abets. 
The case of Powell and English54 also dealt with the principle of disjoinment; i.e. the 
second question of appeal, when a participant to a joint enterprise claims that the 
principal act was outside of the agreed enterprise and therefore an act giving rise to 
individual rather than collective liability. It is difficult however, to rationalise some 
of the decisions that find successful appeal in relation to the application of 
disjoinment, because some decisions, both before and subsequent to the decision in 
Powell and English,55 appear to be in direct conflict with other principles of law. 
Examples include the Northern Ireland case of Gamble56 (knee-capping) and the 
principle of transferred malice had the plan gone awry, or the principle inherent to 
the 'egg shell skull' rule, 57 or even Mair,58 a pub fight in which Mair had a broken 
bottle and the principle a knife. 59 
Proving mens rea is of course no easy matter, in fact there might never be any direct 
evidence to prove what is in the mind of the defendant. Even a statement by the 
defendant that "I am going to fly to Manchester" is only circumstantial, no matter 
how many people hear him say it and testify to the fact. The reason being that it is 
open to a plurality of reasonable interpretations: 
i) Man is incapable of that independent attribute, therefore he 
cannot literally mean what he says; or 
ii) Does he intend to take a plane, piloting it himself, or does he 
mean that he will take a commercial flight; or 
iii) Is it merely the expression of a fanciful desire? 
R v Powell and English [1999] AC 1,[1997] 4 All ER 545, see p.551 judgement of Ui Steyn; see also 
C/ian Wing-Sit, v R [1985) AC 168; IvicAuliffe v R (1995) 130 ALR 26; 1? v Hyde [1990] 3 All ER 892 as 
cited and approved in Powell and English 
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Z!J 
Consequently the statement alone proves little, it is only by adding this to other 
evidence (be that circumstantial or direct evidence) that a determination can be made 
as to what the defendant may have thought or realised; consider the comments in 
McGreevv. 6° In any event it remains speculative because even if the defendant gives 
his own account there is still the possibility that he is lying. As such even when all 
his actions are witnessed, the full extent of his thoughts and intentions remain 
unknown; because once the law determines that there is sufficient intention the 
enquiry stops. The desires, motives or wishes of the accused are irrelevant to his guilt 
(see Sharp61 , Hill v Ellis 62 , and Wai-Yu-ssanz 63 ) although they may be thought to 
mitigate sentence: 
Moral judgements do not effect the criminality of the act though they 
may affect sentence. 'Rea' means criminally, not morally, wrong. TM 
Returning to the problem, if there is evidence that the victim has suffered previous 
physical violence (meaning any unlawful violence 65) which is virtually any violence 
to a child under two and a half years-old, as per the case of Griffin, 66 then provided 
the violence is of a 'like' nature and a contributory cause of death. 67 Once it is 
demonstrated that each parent had such knowledge their failure to exercise that duty 
then becomes an act of facilitation and thereby encouragement. This is no different 
from that found in Russell and Russell. 68 The bar in Lowe 69 is removed for the 
reasons already given. 
This approach does challenge the proposition made by Professor Ashworth that 
Lowe 7° establishes a third limitation; i.e. renders an omission incapable of 
60 
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 Ibid. 
constituting an 'act' for the purposes of unlawful act manslaughter. 7 ' This does not 
mean however, that an omission should constitute an 'act' for the purposes of 
unlawful act manslaughter, just as an act that terminates life does not necessarily 
constitute an 'act' of murder, because as the case of Bland72 proves, some positive 
acts are actually omissions. Equally, some non-acts have to be constructed as positive 
'acts'; for instance where the harm is psychological as in the case of Ireland,73 the 
nature of the 'contact' was a construction, there being no actual physical contact. The 
circumstances of the 'act' have to be weighed in the same manner as the background 
circumstances with 'acts' amounting to gross negligence. 
The statement by the Lord Chief Justice, in Aston and Mason 74 that 'there was no 
evidence to prove the opportunity to intervene in the assault against the baby', is 
therefore negated by this interpretation of facilitation. 
Gibson: come in from the cold 
The case of Gibson and Gibson75 was considered in Lane and Lane,76 the tatter case 
being followed, no doubt, for the reasons stated by the Law Commission. 77 But with 
respect, this author intends to reconcile the cases and demonstrate the validity of the 
foregoing proposition. 
The facts of Gibson and Gibson78 are that a 5 week-old baby was taken to hospital 
and subsequently found to have extensive multiple factures and brain damage. The 
case against the defendants charged each with an offence under section 20 Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, as well as and one under section 1 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933. When rejecting a submission of 'no case to 
' See commentary Lowe [1973] Crim LR 238 at p.240 
72 
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answer'(l) and when summing-up the case (2), the trail judge, Mr Justice Drake, 
stated that: 
(1).. it would be sufficient to sustain a case against either of the 
parents if it were proved that they were parties to a joint enterprise to 
injure the child and that there was sufficient evidence to leave the 
lesser offence under section 20 of the 1861 Act to the jury. 
(2). ..the jury were directed that before they could be satisfied so as to 
be sure that a defendant who is not guilty of a physical act against the 
child should be guilty as a partner, they should be satisfied so as to be 
sure that the other defendant actively approved and by doing so 
encouraged the other in inflicting the injuries. 80 
This approach was rejected by the Court of Appeal, however, Lord O'Connor J when 
giving the judgement of the court did state that: 
In law the defendants had joint custody and control of their baby. They 
were under a duty to care for and protect their baby and ... The 
evidence established that while in their joint custody and control the 
baby had sustained grievous bodily harm which had been inflicted by 
one, other or both parents. There  being no explanation from either 
parent, and no evidence pointing to one rather than the other, the 
inference can properly be drawn that they were jointly responsible and 
so both guilty as charged. 8 ' 
This latter approach is concomitant with the decision in Marsh and Marsh,82 but, if a 
conflict of logic is to be avoided, how are these statements reconciled? The 
prosecution's line of assault was three-fold: 83 
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(1) one, other or both the defendants had inflicted the injuries on the 
baby; and 
(2) on the doctor's evidence the injuries had been inflicted on more 
than one occasion; 
(3) that because they were together most of the time the defendant not 
responsible for an assault must have known about it, and by not 
reporting the matter must have encouraged further assault and thus 
they were both guilty. 
The first is merely a statement and, without more proves nothing. The second is that 
there is a series of injuries. The Third falls within Lord O'Connor i's proposition that 
an inference can be made, if there is nothing more. This assumption of knowledge is 
within the jury's remit to infer, however, the subsequent direction over-rode the 
assumption, as was pointed out by his Lordship in the judgement. Also, the only 
evidence presented by the prosecution actually negated their attack, as stated in the 
following passage: 
Take the brain damage. [If] One parent was the assailant. The theory 
posits that this act of violence was committed in the presence of the 
other parent who encouraged and assented to the assault because he or 
she knew of and had condoned at least one previous serious assault by 
the same parent. There was no evidence from which this inference 
could be drawn--indeed the quilt incident negatived the inference. 84 
There also appears to be a failure to 'prove' knowledge on the part of the other 
defendant, which forms the next sentence in his judgement; i.e. to demonstrate that 
each party knew that the child had suffered previous injury and done nothing, the 
prosecution must demonstrate this for the jury to make the inference. As such, 
provided there is this 'proof of knowledge, which is purely circumstantial, the 
' Ibid. at p.29 
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'implied guilt' principle is the proposition stated re unlawful act manslaughter. That 
is provided the case of Lane and Lane85 can be reconciled. 
LANE: Re-Walked 
Croom-Johnson U refers to the passages mentioned above re Gibson and Gibson,86 
in his judgement in the instant case, at pages 12-14, and most notably the two 
nugatory statements, as well as the 'implied guilt' principle. There is then a reminder 
about the facts, including statements about where the prosecution had erred: 
At all times the prosecution were unable to show when it was inflicted, 
by whom it was inflicted, or how many people were present. 87 
At this point, it should also be noted that the prosecution was seeking to prove a 
singular incident, which makes it quite similar to Gibson and Gibson.88 The 
prosecution however, were able to demonstrate in this case previous injury to the 
child. Equally the jury were at liberty, given the movements of the parents, to dismiss 
the chances of it being a third-party killing; there being no evidence to substantiate 
this anyway. The problem is the summation, which in its language placed the 
defendants together at the time of the incident. But there was no 'direct' proof of this. 
As such the Judge altered the potentially implied transmuting it to an absolute and it 
is this jurisdictional trespass that forms the ratio of the judgement. 
There is also Croom-Johnson U's comments on Ashworth J's fourth judgement, 
from Marsh and Marsh,89 to the effect that: 
It may be that a defendant either does not know the true explanation or 
has no means of knowing the facts which require explaining. 90 
R v Lane and Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5 
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These remarks are accurate and of sound principle generally and possibly form the 
basis for the well-known passage of Croom-Johnson LJ that: 
[For a] lack of explanation, to have any cogency, [it] must happen in 
circumstances which point to guilt; it must point to a necessary 
knowledge and realisation of that person's own fault. To begin with, 
one can only expect an explanation from someone who is proved to 
have been present. Otherwise it is no more consistent with that person 
either not knowing what happened or not knowing the facts from 
which what happened can be inferred, or with a wish to cover up for 
someone else suspected of being the criminal. There may be other 
resons. 91 
But with the greatest respect, when considering the second judgement in Gibson and 
Gibson;92 which states that inferences can be drawn from the fact that a parent has a 
duty to the child and therefore a duty to give an account. Then when the defendants 
are not forthcoming in circumstances that call for an answer, the jury can draw what 
inference they consider best suits the circumstance or narrative. The last opportunity 
to give such an account is the courtroom, it should be noted that defence of 'marriage 
privilege' has been removed. 93 Equally, it fails to account for the fact that a joint 
enterprise does not require presence at the scene of the crime; as such the comments 
in this context become a distraction. A case in point is that of Wragg. 94 In this case, 
there appears to have been a discussion about a future course of action that involved 
terminating their son's life. On the evening in question, Mrs Wragg left the house 
with their other son, thereby facilitating the actions of Mr Wragg, re their remaining 
son. The Judge, comments specifically on Mrs Wragg's complicity in the crime. 95 As 
such it can be deduced that she knew of Mr Wragg's intention, she omitted to protect 
the child and was not present at the scene of the crime, as such her act of facilitation 
involves her in the principal offence. This, therefore, falls within the ambit of 
' R v Lane and Lane (1986)82 CrApp R Sat p.14 
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Russell. 96 To restrict any answers or comment only to those present, potentially 
distracts the court from gaining the information it needs and defeats the purpose of 
Lord O'Connor J's second judgement. 
Summary 
It can be concluded that Lowe 97 forms no bar to the prosecution presenting either a 
charge of gross negligence manslaughter or one of unlawfiul act manslaughter, when 
that 'act' is by omission. The case, and its principle, is nothing more than a general 
one of law and does not create any special restriction. In fact the words of Lord 
Justice Hobhouse in Coles98 are apt: 
The inferences to be drawn from the intentional commission of the act 
will normally provide the primary proof of the relevant mental state... 
In any given case, other evidence may confirm or detract from the 
inference... It is open to the defendant in any case to destroy or rebut 
the inference which the Crown seeks to rely upon. 99 
This is also true of the evidence in Gibson and Gibson,'°° where the 'quilt-incident' 
negated the assumption. The fact that the charge does not automatically follow is no 
different to saying that the prosecution must prove its case. This assertion is also true 
of the proposition that 'parents are in no different a position to that of the ordinary 
defendant', especially when considering a singular incident; consider Lane and 
Lane.' ° ' However, when there is a catalogue of incidents, as in Russell and 
Russell,' °2 Marsh and Marsh'°3 and even Slrudwick,' 04 the law can look to the 
defendants with responsibility to give account; in this regard the law already has the 
teeth that the Law Commission's proposal lacked. Therefore, the principle in 
Russell [1933) VLR 59 
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Abbott' 05 remains true. When the case involoves a singular incident the prosecution 
must prove either the actual offender, or that there was a joint enterprise, lack of 
evidence or silence will generally defeat the prosecution's assertions: Lane and 
Lane.' °6 However, when there has been more than one incident against the victim, 
(provided death results from that kind of injury or harm) if the prosecution 'prove' 
knowledge and a lack of disjoinment both parents are culpable and potentially liable. 
An inconceivable or untenable excuse will not exonerate the defendant: Marsh and 
Marsh.'°7 Equally there is no reverse burden of proof, because the prosecution must 
construct a case against the defendants from the circumstantial evidence available,' 08 
but for all intents and purposes, the defendant's knowledge is the key. Neither is 
there any conflict with European jurisprudence: Sheldrake' °9 and Salabiaku!'° It is 
accepted that there may be other reasons why a prosecution might no be pursued, but 
it is asserted that it not for the reasons existent in the now rather ethereal lacuna 
which is formed on the assertion that there is no evidence. 
In pursuance of this rationale, it might also be stated that the increase of sentence 
under section 1 of the 1933 Act has distracted the courts from its original intent. 
Responsibility is onerous and as such failure brings liability. In Falkingham' ''the 
mother sent her baby to its father by the railway's parcel service, as such she exposed 
the child to potential harm and was guilty of an offence under section 1. This is 
comparable to Litch field' 12  who, as ship's captain, was responsible for the passengers 
and who equally exposed them to danger by sailing the potentially hazardous course. 
Therefore the offences under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, section 1, 
and the Merchant Shipping Act 1970 (Repealed), section 27, are comparable." 3 As 
shown, there is no bar to the prosecution seeking to press for a manslaughter charge 
where greater subjective liability can be demonstrated. 
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Conclusion 
The problem identified at the root of the proposals was a lacuna that states: 
A child is cared for by two people (both parents, or a parent and 
another person). The child dies and medical evidence suggests that the 
death occurred as a result of ill-treatment. It is not clear which of the 
two carers is directly responsible for the ill-treatment which caused 
death. It is clear that at least one of the carers is guilty of a very serious 
criminal offence but it is possible that the ill-treatment occurred while 
one carer was.asleep, or out of the room. 1 
Because of this and the lobbying by such groups as the NSPCC about a lack of 
prosecution, 2 the Law Commission were asked to make recommendations to close 
the apparent lacuna. These Reports, Children: Non Accidental Death or Serious 
Injury3 and the proposals contained within them formed the background and enquiry 
of this dissertation. The first phase was to assess the validity of the proposals against 
the Law commission's own standard: 
A new offence must be justifiable on its own terms 4 
Close examination reveals that the proposals fail to achieve this goal. The main 
proposal is an offence based on section 1 of the 1933 Act. But it has been shown to 
be flawed, because the inclusion of what appeared to be an objective test, i.e. 'ought 
to have known', is subject to the requirements of Sheppard that interpret the 
principle requirements of the offence under section 1 of the 1933 Act. As a result, 
this has the effect of duplicating the test in Adomako. 6 The remaining operative 
clauses, such as the removal of the 'half-time' rule (clause 7), and the drawing of 
'Law Corn 279 & 282 pan LI 
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adverse inferences (clause 8), were also found to be flawed. The former fails because 
the prosecution have to adduce evidence which according to the lacuna does not exist 
and the latter fails because on examination it only repeats provisions which already 
operate generally within the law. Having examined the clauses individually, the 
proposals as a whole were tested against those cases used by the Law Commission to 
demonstrate the existence of the lacuna. However, it became apparent that the 
failings in these cases were not because of a deficiency in the evidence, which the 
lacuna is meant to demonstrate, but rather because of an error in procedural approach 
to the cases when heard at first instance. It has to be noted that there was always 
going to be a difficulty in proving the negative aspect of the lacuna when utilising 
cases that to some degree had a positive evidential element. 
The second chapter re-examined these cases to disprove the existence of the lacuna, 
first in respect of the offence of gross negligence manslaughter, and then again in 
respects of unlawful act manslaughter. Examination of the leading case on gross 
negligence manslaughter, Adomako 7 which is said to be objective, was actually 
shown to be in a separate category falling into the middle ground between a strict 
objective test, as in Ca/dwell, 8 and the completely subjective test of Cunningham.9 
This was achieved by demonstrating that the risk element should form the 
background of circumstance upon which the actions of the defendant are 'played-
out'. This approach reconciles the apparent disparity between the 'risk of death' and 
'injury to health and welfare' requirements approved by the House of Lords. Further 
to this, the apparent bar and anomaly that was perceived as existing in the case of 
Lowe' ° was also explained and reconciled against the cases of Senior and 
Adomako' 2 and thereby removed. 
In relation to unlawful act manslaughter the 'duty of care' requirement necessary to 
prove cases of negligence was incorporated to construct a hypothesis of joint 
enterprise and the remaining cases were then explained against this hypothesis; most 
Ibid. 
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notably the cases of Gibson and Gibson' 3 and Lane and Lane,'4 the former of these 
two cases appears to have been overshadowed by the latter. Reconciliation of these 
cases however, has proved the validity of the hypothesis; which was first alluded to 
in the case of Gibson and Gibson.'5 Lowe' 6 has also been considered an obstacle in 
respect to unlawful act manslaughter, by virtue of it baring omissions from 
consideration within this offence. However, it has been demonstrated and proved by 
example (albeit a non-prosecuted example), that once knowledge is proved an 
omission to exercise a duty becomes an act of facilitation, thereby falling into the 
Judicial Studies board's specimen directions that: 
An agreement can be inferred from the behaviour of the parties.' 7 
Therefore, the law is already capable of bring a prosecution against those responsible 
for these crimes and their infringements against society. This approach may be 
considered fragile, but given the fact that in a recent manslaughter and cruelty to a 
child case, Wright,' 8 the defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 12 years 
imprisonment for manslaughter and 5 years for child cruelty, such sentences would 
hardly seem to suggest that 'someone got away with murder'. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Offences A2ainst Children Bill 2004 (Proposed) 
1 	 Cruelty contributing to death 
In the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c.12), after section 1 
(cruelty to persons under sixteen), insert - 
"1A Cruelty contributing to death 
(1) 	 A person is guilty of an offence if- 
(a) he commits an offence under section 1 against a child or young 
person ("C"); 
(b) suffering or injury to health of a kind which was likely to be caused to 
C by the commission of that offence occurs; and 
(c) its occurrence results in, or contributes significantly to, C's death. 
(2) 	 A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on 
indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to a 
fine, or to both." 
2 	 Failure to protect a child 
(1) 	 A person ("R") is guilty of an offence if - 
(a) at a time when subsection (3) applies, R is aware or ought to be 
aware that there is a real risk that an offence specified in 
Schedule 1 might be committed against a child ("C"); 
(b) R fails to take such steps as it would be reasonable to expect R 
to take to prevent the commission of the offence; 
(c) an offence specified in Schedule 1 is committed against C; and 
(d) the offence is committed in circumstances of the kind that R 
anticipated or ought to have anticipated. 
(2) 	 A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable - 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum, or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 7 years or to a fine, or to both. 
(3) 	 This subsection applies if R - 
(a) is at least 16 years old; 
E;t 
(b) has responsibility for C; and 
(c) is connected with C. 
(4) 	 R is connected with C if - 
(a) they live in the same household; 
(b) they are related; or 
(c) R looks after C under a child care arrangement. 
(5) 	 R and C are related if they are relatives within the meaning of Part 4 of 
the Family Law Act 1996 (c.27). 
(6) 	 R looks after C under a child care arrangement if R - 
(a) looks after C (whether alone or with other children) under 
arrangements made with a person who lives in the same household 
as, or is related to, C; and 
(b) does so wholly or mainly in C's home. 
(7) 	 It does not matter whether R looks after C for reward or on a regular or 
occasional basis. 
3 	 Effect of intoxication 
(1) 	 A person's voluntary intoxication is to be disregarded in determining - 
(a) for the purposes of section 2(1)(a), whether he ought to be aware of a 
risk; and 
(b) for the purposes of section 2(1)(b), what steps it would be reasonable 
to expect him to take. 
(2) 	 A person's intoxication is voluntary if he takes an intoxicant, or allows an 
intoxicant to be administered to him - 
(a) knowing that it is or may be an intoxicant; and 
(b) otherwise than in accordance with medical advice. 
(3) 	 "Intoxicant" means alcohol, drugs or anything else which may impair 
awareness. 
(4) 	 A person's intoxication is to be taken to be voluntary unless sufficient 
evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to whether it was 
voluntary. 
(5) 	 Where sufficient evidence is so adduced, the court is to assume that his 
intoxication was not voluntary unless the prosecution prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that it was. 
4 	 The statutory responsibility 
(1) 	 This section applies if a serious offence has been committed against a child or 
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that such an offence has been 
committed. 
(2) 	 Any person who had responsibility for the child at the relevant time also has 
the responsibility imposed by this section ("the statutory responsibility"). 
(3) 	 "The relevant time" means - 
(a) the time when the offence was committed (if known); or 
(b) any time during the period within which the offence could have been 
committed. 
(4) 	 The statutory responsibility is responsibility for assisting - 
(a) the police in any investigation of the offence, and 
(b) the court in any proceedings in respect of the offence, by providing as 
much information as the person is able to give about whether and, if so, 
by whom and in what circumstances the offence was committed. 
5 	 Investigations by the police 
(1) 	 This section applies if a constable - 
(a) is investigating a serious offence against a child; and 
(b) reasonably suspects that a person whom he is questioning in 
connection with the offence ("A") is subject to the statutory 
responsibility in relation to the offence. 
(2) 	 If A is being questioned under caution, the constable must inform A of his 
suspicion - 
(a) when he cautions A; or 
(b) as soon as he forms that suspicion (if later). 
(3) 	 When giving that information, the constable must explain - 
(a) the nature of the statutory responsibility; and 
(b) the effect of subsections (5) and (6). 
(4) 	 If A is not being questioned under caution, the constable may 
nevertheless give A - 
(a) the information mentioned in subsection (2); and 
(b) an explanation of the nature of the statutory responsibility and the 
effect of subsection (5). 
(5) A is not obliged to answer a question put to him by a constable 
investigating an offence merely because he is, or may be, subject to the 
statutory responsibility in relation to the offence. 
(6) But if section 34(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
(c.33) (circumstances in which inferences may be drawn from failure to 
mention facts) applies in relation to a failure by A to mention any fact, a 
court, judge or jury may, in deciding whether it is proper to draw an 
inference under that provision, take into account any evidence that A was 
given the information and explanations mentioned in subsections (2) and 
(3). 
6 	 Responsibility of witness in criminal proceedings 
(1) 	 This section applies if a person ("W") - 
(a) is a witness in criminal proceedings for a serious offence against a 
child; but 
(b) is not a person charged with an offence in those proceedings. 
(2) 	 If the court is of the opinion that W is subject to the statutory 
responsibility in relation to the offence, it may - 
(a) inform W of its opinion; and 
(b) explain to W the nature of that responsibility and the effect of this 
section. 
(3) 	 If the court acts under subsection (2), it may take into account that W 
was given that information and explanation in determining - 
(a) whether W's behaviour as a witness has amounted to contempt of 
court; and 
(b) if it has, what punishment to impose. 
(4) 	 This section does not - 
(a) oblige W to answer any question which W is entitled to refuse to 
answer as a result of any enactment or on the ground of privilege; or 
(b) affect the court's power, in the exercise of its general discretion, to 
excuse a witness from answering a question. 
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7 	 Special procedure during trial 
(1) 	 This section applies if - 
(a) a person is, or two or more persons are, charged with a serious 
offence against a child; and 
(b) at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, it has been 
proved to the court that three conditions are met. 
(2) 	 The first condition is that the offence charged or any alternative offence 
has been committed (but it is not necessary for it to have been proved 
which of those offences was committed). 
(3) 	 The second is that- 
(a) the number of persons who could have committed the offence charged 
or any alternative offence is known; and 
(b) those persons can be described, whether by reference to their names, 
their personal characteristics or their relationship to one another or to 
other persons. 
(4) 	 The third is that- 
(a) if there is only one accused, he is subject to the statutory 
responsibility in relation to the offence charged; or 
(b) if there are two or more accused, at least one of them is subject to 
that responsibility in relation to the offence charged. 
(5) 	 If the court is satisfied, in respect of the accused, or an accused, that he 
could not have committed the offence charged or any alternative 
offence- 
(a) the court must acquit him of the offence charged or direct his 
acquittal; and 
(b) he may not be convicted of any alternative offence. 
(6) 	 Subsection (7) applies if, after the court has acted under subsection (5)- 
(a) one or more persons remain accused of the offence charged; and 
(b) the third condition continues to be met. 
(7) 	 A submission that the accused, or an accused, does not have a case to 
answer in relation to the offence charged or an alternative offence may 
not be made at any time before the conclusion of the evidence for the 
accused or all of the accused. 
(8) 	 If the court considers at the conclusion of the evidence for the accused, or 
all of the accused, that no court or no jury properly directed could 
properly convict the accused, or an accused, of the offence charged- 
(a) the court must acquit him of that offence or direct his acquittal; and 
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(b) if the court is of the same opinion in relation to an alternative offence, 
he may not be convicted of that offence. 
(9) 	 This section does not affect- 
(a) any power a court may have to acquit or direct the acquittal of an 
accused otherwise than on a submission made on his behalf; or 
(b) any power a court may have to discharge a jury or otherwise prevent 
a trial continuing. 
(10) "Alternative offence", in relation to an offence charged, means any other 
offence of which the accused could lawfully be convicted on that charge. 
8 	 Inferences from accused's silence 
(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) is amended as 
follows. 
(2) In section 35 (effect of accused's silence at trial), after subsection (7), 
insert- 
"(8) This section does not apply if section 35A applies." 
(3) After section 35, insert- 
"35A Effect of accused's silence at trial in special cases 
(1) This section applies if a person is on trial for a serious offence against 
a child and, at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution- 
(a) it has been proved to the court that the conditions in section 7(2) 
to (4) of the Act of 2004 (conditions for application of special 
procedure) apply in relation to the offence; 
(b) section 7(7) of that Act (restriction on submissions of no case) 
applies in relation to the offence; and 
(c) the court is of the opinion that the accused is subject to the 
statutory responsibility in relation to the offence. 
(2) But this section does not apply if- 
(a) the accused's guilt is not in issue, or 
(b) it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the 
accused makes it undesirable for him to give evidence. 
(3) The court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, 
satisfy itself that the accused is aware- 
w 
(a) that the court is of the opinion that he is subject to the statutory 
responsibility in relation to the offence; 
(b) of the nature of that responsibility; 
(c) that the stage has been reached at which evidence can be given 
for the defence and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence; 
(d) that, if he chooses not to give evidence or, having been sworn, 
refuses, without good cause, to answer any question, it will be 
permissible for the court or jury to draw such inferences as appear 
proper from that failure or refusal; and 
(e) that, in deciding whether it is proper to draw an inference, the 
court or jury may, if it is of the opinion that he is subject to the 
statutory responsibility in relation to the offence, take that into 
account. 
(4) If the accused- 
(a) fails to give evidence, or 
(b) refuses, without good cause, to answer any question, the court or 
jury may, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged or any other offence of which he could lawfully be 
convicted on that charge, draw such inferences as appear proper 
from the failure or refusal. 
(5) If the court or jury is of the opinion that the accused is subject to the 
statutory responsibility in relation to the offence charged- 
(a) it must consider any explanation which has been given in evidence 
for the failure or refusal; but 
(b) it is not necessary for it to be satisfied, before drawing an 
inference (whether in relation to that offence or any other offence 
of which he could lawfully be convicted on that charge), that he 
could be properly convicted, on the basis of the other evidence 
against him, if no such inference were drawn. 
(6) Subsections (4) and (5) of section 35 apply for the purposes of this 
section as they apply for the purposes of section 35. 
(7) In this section- 
(a) "the Act of 2004" means the Offences Against Children Act 2004; 
and 
(b) "serious offence against a child" and "statutory responsibility" (in 
relation to such an offence) have the same meaning as in Part 2 of 
that Act." 
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9 	 Savings and interpretation 
(1) Nothing in this Part affects any provision which has the result that an answer 
or evidence given by a person in specified circumstances is not admissible in 
evidence against him, or some other person, in any proceedings or class of 
proceedings. 
(2) Nothing in this Part restricts any power of a court to exclude evidence 
(whether by preventing questions being put or otherwise). 
(3) In subsection (1), the reference to giving evidence is a reference to giving 
evidence in any manner, whether by providing information, making 
discovery, producing documents or otherwise. 
(4) In this Part, "serious offence" means an offence specified in Schedule 2. 
10 	 Interpretation: general 
(1) "Child" means a person under the age of 16. 
(2) "The 1933 Act" means the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12). 
(3) Section 17 of the 1933 Act (persons presumed to have responsibility for a 
child) applies for the purposes of this Act as it applies for the purposes of 
Part 1 of that Act. 
11 	 Minor and consequential amendments 
Schedule 3 contains minor and consequential amendments. 
12 	 Commencement and transitional provisions 
(1) 	 This Act, except this section and section 13, comes into force on such day as 
the Secretary of State may by order appoint. 
(2) 	 An order under subsection (1) may- 
(a) make different provision for different purposes; 
(b) include supplementary, incidental, saving or transitional provisions. 
(3) 	 Any provision of sections 6 to 8 and Part 2 of Schedule 3 has effect only 
in relation to criminal proceedings begun on or after the commencement 
of that provision. 
13 	 Short title and extent 
(1) 	 This Act may be cited as the Offences Against Children Act 2004. 
APPENDIX TWO 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
1 	 Cruelty to persons under sixteen 
(1) 	 If any person who has attained the age of sixteen years and has 
responsibility for any child or young person under that age, wilfully 
assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or exposes him, or causes or 
procures him to be assaulted, ill-treated, neglected, abandoned, or 
exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or 
injury to health (including injury to or loss of sight, or hearing, or 
limb, or organ of the body, and any mental derangement), that 
person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable - 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine, or alternatively, or in 
addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten 
years; 
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum, or alternatively, or in addition thereto, to 
imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months. 
17 	 Interpretation of Part I 
(2) 	 For the purposes of this Part of this Act, the following shall be 
presumed to have responsibility for a child or young person - 
(a) any person who - 
(i) has parental responsibility for him (within the meaning of the 
Children Act 1989); or 
(ii) is otherwise legally liable to maintain him; and 
(b) any person who has care of him. 
(3) 	 A person who is presumed to be responsible for a child or young 
person by virtue of subsection (1)(a) shall not be taken to have 
ceased to be responsible for him by reason only that he does not 
have care of him. 
APPENDIX THREE 
Merchant Shipping Act 1970 
(Repealed) 
27 Offences by Seamen 
(1) 	 If the master or any member of the crew of a ship registered in the 
United Kingdom 
(a) does any act which causes or is likely to cause the loss or destruction 
of or serious damage to the ship or the death of or serious injury to a 
person on board the ship; or 
(b) omits to do anything required to preserve the ship from loss, 
destruction or serious damage or to preserve any person on board the 
ship from death or serious injury; 
And the act or omission is deliberate, or amounts to a breach or neglect 
of duty, or he is under the influence of drink or a drug at the time of the 
actor omission, he shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, and on 
summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £200. 
(2) 	 In this section "breach or neglect of duty", except in relation to a master, 
includes any disobedience to a lawful command. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
Children Act 1989 
2 	 Parental responsibility for children 
(1) 	 Where a child's father and mother were married to each other at the time 
of his birth, they shall each have parental responsibility for the child. 
(2) 	 Where a child's father and mother were not married to each other at the 
time of his birth- 
(a) the mother shall have parental responsibility for the child; 
(b) the father [shall have parental responsibility for the child if he has 
acquired it (and has not ceased to have it)] in accordance with thE 
provisions of this Act. 
(3) 	 References in this Act to a child whose father and mother were, or (as the 
case may be) were not, married to each other at the time of his birth 
must be read with section 1 of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 (which 
extends their meaning). 
(4) 	 The rule of law that a father is the natural guardian of his legitimate child 
is abolished. 
(5) 	 More than one person may have parental responsibility for the same child 
at the same time. 
(6) 	 A person who has parental responsibility for a child at any time shall not 
cease to have that responsibility solely because some other person 
subsequently acquires parental responsibility for the child. 
(7) 	 Where more than one person has parental responsibility for a child, each 
of them may act alone and without the other (or others) in meeting that 
responsibility; but nothing in this Part shall be taken to affect the 
operation of any enactment which requires the consent of more than one 
person in a matter affecting the child. 
(8) 	 The fact that a person has parental responsibility for a child shall not 
entitle him to act in any way which would be incompatible with any order 
made with respect to the child under this Act. 
(9) 	 A person who has parental responsibility for a child may not surrender or 
transfer any part of that responsibility to another but may arrange for 
some or all of it to be met by one or more persons acting on his behalf. 
(10) The person with whom any such arrangement is made may himself be a 
person who already has parental responsibility for the child concerned. 
(11) The making of any such arrangement shall not affect any liability of the 
person making it which may arise from any failure to meet any part of his 
parental responsibility for the child concerned. 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
34 	 Effect of accused's failure to mention facts when questioned or 
charged 
(1) 	 Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is 
given that the accused- 
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being 
questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or 
by whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact 
relied on in his defence in those proceedings; or 
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might 
be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact, 
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused 
could reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned, 
charged or informed, as the case may be, subsection (2) below applies. 
(2) 	 Where this subsection applies- 
[(a) a magistrates' court inquiring into the offence as examining justices;] 
(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the 
accused under- 
(I) section 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (application for dismissal 
of charge of serious fraud in respect of which notice of transfer has 
been given under section 4 of that Act); or 
(ii) paragraph 5 of Schedule 6 to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
(application for dismissal of charge of violent or sexual offence 
involving child in respect of which notice of transfer has been given 
under section 53 of that Act) 
[paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998]; 
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and 
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged, 
may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper. 
[(2A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of 
the failure, subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply if he had not been 
allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to being questioned, 
charged or informed as mentioned in subsection (1) above.] 
(3) 	 Subject to any directions by the court, evidence tending to establish the 
failure may be given before or after evidence tending to establish the fact 
which the accused is alleged to have failed to mention. 
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(4) 	 his section applies in relation to questioning by persons (other than 
constables) charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging 
offenders as it applies in relation to questioning by constables; and in 
subsection (1) above "officially informed" means informed by a constable 
or any such person. 
(5) 	 This section does not- 
(a) prejudice the admissibility in evidence of the silence or other reaction 
of the accused in the face of anything said in his presence relating to 
the conduct in respect of which he is charged, in so far as evidence 
thereof would be admissible apart from this section; or 
(b) preclude the drawing of any inference from any such silence or other 
reaction of the accused which could properly be drawn apart from this 
section. 
(6) 	 This section does not apply in relation to a failure to mention a fact if the 
failure occurred before the commencement of this section. 
(7) 
35 	 Effect of accused's silence at trial 
(1) 	 At the trial of any person . . . for an offence, subsections (2) and (3) 
below apply unless- 
(a) the accused's guilt is not in issue; or 
(b) it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the 
accused makes it undesirable for him to give evidence; 
but subsection (2) below does not apply if, at the conclusion of the 
evidence for the prosecution, his legal representative informs the court 
that the accused will give evidence or, where he is unrepresented, the 
court ascertains from him that he will give evidence. 
(2) 	 Where this subsection applies, the court shall, at the conclusion of the 
evidence for the prosecution, satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on 
indictment [with a iurv], in the presence of the jury) that the accused is 
aware that the stage has been reached at which evidence can be given for 
the defence and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence and that, if he 
chooses not to give evidence, or having been sworn, without good cause 
refuses to answer any question, it will be permissible for the court or jury 
to draw such inferences as appear proper from his failure to give evidence 
or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question. 
(3) 	 Where this subsection applies, the court or jury, in determining whether 
the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences as 
appear proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence or his 
refusal, without good cause, to answer any question. 
(4) 	 This section does not render the accused compellable to give evidence on 
his own behalf, and he shall accordingly not be guilty of contempt of court 
by reason of a failure to do so. 
(5) 	 For the purposes of this section a person who, having been sworn, refuses 
to answer any question shall be taken to do so without good cause 
unless- 
(a) he is entitled to refuse to answer the question by virtue of any 
enactment, whenever passed or made, or on the ground of privilege; 
or 
(b) the court in the exercise of its general discretion excuses him from 
answering it. 
(6) 
(7) 	 This section applies- 
(a) in relation to proceedings on indictment for an offence, only if the 
person charged with the offence is arraigned on or after the 
commencement of this section; 
(b) in relation to proceedings in a magistrates court, only if the time 
when the court begins to receive evidence in the proceedings falls 
after the commencement of this section. 
APPENDIX SIX 
Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 
5 	 The offence 
Causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult 
(1) 	 A person ("D") is guilty of an offence if- 
(a) a child or vulnerable adult ("V") dies as a result of the unlawful act of 
a person who- 
(i) was a member of the same household as V 1 and 
(U) had frequent contact with him, 
(b) D was such a person at the time of that act, 
(c) at that time there was a significant risk of serious physical harm being 
caused to V by the unlawful act of such a person, and 
(d) either D was the person whose act caused V's death or- 
(I) D was, or ought to have been, aware of the risk mentioned in 
paragraph (c), 
(ii) D failed to take such steps as he could reasonably have been 
expected to take to protect V from the risk, and 
(iii) the act occurred in circumstances of the kind that D foresaw or 
ought to have foreseen. 
(2) 	 The prosecution does not have to prove whether it is the first alternative in 
subsection (1)(d) or the second (sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii)) that applies. 
(3) 	 If D was not the mother or father of V- 
(a) D may not be charged with an offence under this section if he was 
under the age of 16 at the time of the act that caused V's death; 
(b) for the purposes of subsection (1)(d)(ii) D could not hav e been 
expected to take any such step as is referred to there before attaining 
that age. 
(4) 	 For the purposes of this section- 
(a) a person is to be regarded as a "member" of a particular household, 
even if he does not live in that household, if he visits it so often and 
for such periods of time that it is reasonable to regard him as a 
member of it; 
(b) where V lived in different households at different times, "the same 
household as V" refers to the household in which V was living at the 
time of the act that caused V's death. 
(5) 	 For the purposes of this section an "unlawful" act is one that- 
(a) constitutes an offence, or 
(b) would constitute an offence but for being the act of- 
(i) a person under the age of ten, or 
(ii) a person entitled to rely on a defence of insanity. 
Paragraph (b) does not apply to an act of D. 
(6) In this section- 
"act" includes a course of conduct and also includes omission;"child" 
means a person under the age of 16;"serious" harm means harm that 
amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against 
the Person Act 1861 (c 100);"vulnerable adult" means a person aged 16 
or over whose ability to protect himself from violence, abuse or neglect is 
significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, 
through old age or otherwise. 
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on 
indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or to a fine, 
or to both. 
6 	 Evidence and procedure: England and Wales 
(1) 	 Subsections (2) to (4) apply where a person ("the defendant") is charged 
in the same proceedings with an offence of murder or manslaughter and 
with an offence under section 5 in respect of the same death ("the section 
5 offence"). 
(2) 	 Where by virtue of section 35(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 (c 33) a court or jury is permitted, in relation to the section 5 
offence, to draw such inferences as appear proper from the defendant's 
failure to give evidence or refusal to answer a question, the court or jury 
may also draw such inferences in determining whether he is guilty- 
(a) of murder or manslaughter, or 
(b) of any other offence of which he could lawfully be convicted on the 
charge of murder or manslaughter, even if there would otherwise be no 
case for him to answer in relation to that offence. 
(3) 	 The charge of murder or manslaughter is not to be dismissed under 
paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c 37) 
(unless the section 5 offence is dismissed). 
(4) 	 At the defendant's trial the question whether there is a case for the 
defendant to answer on the charge of murder or manslaughter is not to be 
considered before the close of all the evidence (or, if at some earlier time 
he ceases to be charged with the section 5 offence, before that earlier 
time). 
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(5) 	 An offence under section 5 is an offence of homicide for the purposes of 
the following enactments- 
sections 24 and 25 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c 43) (mode 
of trial of child or young person for indictable offence); 
section 51A of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (sending cases to the 
Crown Court: children and young persons); 
section 8 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c 6) 
(power and duty to remit young offenders to youth courts for 
sentence). 
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